

TWO ESSAYS
ON
THEOLOGY AND ETHICS

BY
HIRALAL HALDAR, M.A.



Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy
and
Assistant Professor of English Literature
Rajchunder College, Barisal.

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PREFACE.

The materials for this little volume have largely been gathered from several short articles contributed by me to the columns of the *Indian Messenger*, a weekly journal published ^{at} ~~from~~ Calcutta. Those articles have now been pieced together, with considerable additions and alterations, in the form of two connected essays. In some places, the mode of argument has been entirely changed.

My object in writing this book is to supply a short introduction to the Neo-Kantian or Neo-Hegelian Philosophy of Great Britain. Of course, I do not hope that by reading this book only any one will be able to form a clear idea of the leading positions of that Philosophy. But I think that it may with advantage be made the basis of lectures to students. The principles briefly enunciated in it can easily be illustrated and supplemented by the *viva voce* remarks of the lecturer.

In writing the following essays, I have not followed any particular thinker. Certainly, no original doctrine is to be found in them. But for the manner of presenting the arguments, I alone am responsible. The writers to whom I am indebted for the main principles unfolded in the essays are Dr.

J. H. Stirling, Dr. John Caird, T. H. Green, G. S. Morris, Professors Edward Caird, R. Adamson, J. Watson, A. Seth, W. Wallace, Mr. Bradley and a few others. I, however, owe most of all to the late Professor Green, Professor Caird and Mr. Bradley. The direct knowledge of Kant and Hegel that I have is derived from what translations of their works exist in English.

The second essay, I am afraid, will seem rather controversial to many. In consideration of its size, the space devoted to the criticism of hedonism and the "Ethics of Inwardness" is, no doubt, disproportionate. But I do not regret this. In my opinion, one of the best means of making the fundamental principles of a theory clearly understood is to expose the weak points of its rival theories and to compare them with it.

In conclusion, I have to express my obligation to Mr. Raicharan Mukerji for his kindly assisting me in looking over the proof-sheets.

May, 1891.

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HIRALAL HALDAR.

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IT is an opinion very generally prevalent that the theistic proof is of the nature of inference. The existence of God, it is supposed, must be inferred from the existence of the universe by the help of the law of causation, from the existence of adaptations in nature and from the moral nature of man. Whatever may be the strength of these arguments, they labour greatly under the disadvantage of being inferential in their character. Inference may lead us to a strong probability or even to moral certainty, but it cannot give that degree of satisfaction to the inquiring mind which a strict *a priori* proof does. But even if it were granted that the *a posteriori* arguments prove the existence of God with perfect certainty, still it must be confessed that they utterly fail to satisfy

the essential demands of religion. It is not sufficient to say that God exists or that He is intelligent and omnipotent. He must be realised as the inmost essence of the universe—the highest reality for whom and in whom everything else has being and truth. But how are we to prove this? The three time-honoured Theistic proofs are appealed to but in vain. They cannot lead us to so high a conception of God. The utmost that they can do is to prove inferentially that God exists and that He is the intelligent cause and moral governor of the universe. The argument from causation tells us that inasmuch as the universe is an effect, it must have a being of immense power as its cause. The design and the moral argument prove that such a being is intelligent and holy. To say, however, that God is the intelligent creator and moral governor of the universe is not the same thing as to say that He is the truth and essence of it. We can very well conceive Him to have created the world and afterwards left it to its own fate. His relation to the world may, for aught we know, be the same as that of the watch-maker to the watch. The deistic conception of God is perfectly compatible with the conclusions to which the moral, the cosmological and the teleological arguments lead us. But such theistic proofs as can

make alliance with deism are unable to give permanent satisfaction to a truly religious and philosophical mind. The necessity is forced upon him of seeking some other foundation of his religious faith.

Another objection which I have to urge against the common-place *a posteriori* arguments is that they seek God somewhere behind the universe. They pretend to lead us *from* the creation *to* the Creator, as if the Creator were veiled behind His own creation, instead of being revealed in all His glory in it. To the true theist, there is no such transition from *from* to *to*. His language is *in*. His God does not dwell somewhere behind the universe, but manifests Himself in His resplendent glory in the untold wealth of this vast creation.

But, the question now arises, is there any method by which the immanence of God in the universe can be proved? The answer is, there is. It is only necessary for us to inquire into the possibility of our own life, knowledge and experience to understand the nature of God and to meet Him face to face. To know oneself is to know God. We take our own being and the external realities, the knowledge of which finds entrance into our minds through the senses, as given facts, into the nature and possibility of which we seldom

enquire. We know that we exist, we know that we see, feel, taste, hear, smell, work and move about; we know that we think and reason, but we do not know what is involved, what is implied in all this. We go in vain to the psychologist to learn something about the mysteries of mind and its so-called faculties. He will tell us, if he is an adherent of the intuitional school, that mind is an entity different from matter, that it cannot be identified with sensations and feelings and that its faculties are innate. The knowledge of the external world is gained by it through the senses. If the psychologist is an empiricist, he will deny that mind has a separate existence, identify it with the series of its sensations and feelings and attempt to derive all the higher faculties of the soul from sensations and some elementary laws of association. When these learned men debate argue and fight with each other, we enquirers are left entirely in the dark. Our difficulties remain the same. The intuitional psychologist in saying that the knowledge of the external world is gained by the mind through the senses, evades the real difficulty with which a philosopher has to deal. Our question is what *is* the external world, what does it imply and *how* is its knowledge possible, be the channel of its communication to the mind what it may.

The *possibility* of such a communication must be shown before determining the manner and means of it. The conditions and presuppositions of the possibility of the knowledge of external realities must be previously determined with clearness, accuracy and precision. The existence of the external world must not be assumed but explained. How is its existence possible and what does it imply and presuppose? What are the conditions of the existence of the orderly phenomena of the universe? No psychological analysis of the phenomena of mind will be able to furnish answers to questions like these. Locke wrote a big volume to trace the growth of mind, to show how the mind arrives at the state of mature knowledge, with its reasoning faculties fully developed, from the condition of a *tabula rasa*. But he began by quietly assuming the existence of the material world, as if it stood in no need of explanation. Indeed, the common belief is, that it is the province of physical and experimental science to ascertain the laws of the material world, it being the aim of psychology, which is often confounded with metaphysics, to deal with the phenomena of mind. But, in truth, metaphysics is a higher science than physics. The business of metaphysics is to deduce and to trace to their ultimate principle the fundamental

laws of nature ascertained by physics. Physics is not a final science. It has its assumptions and presuppositions which it leaves to metaphysics to deal with. Metaphysics by *deducing* the laws of nature discovered by physics, exhibits the conditions of the existence of the external world. In this way alone, the demands of true philosophy are met. Physics finds out *empirically* the laws of nature, psychology traces the growth of knowledge in the individual mind ; but metaphysics goes beyond both of these sciences, inasmuch as it shows *how* the world exists and thereby supplies a foundation to psychology. Ordinary psychologists evade the necessity of facing the metaphysical problems by accepting without examination the vulgar theory of the passage of the knowledge of external things into the mind. Their object is to explain mysteries, but they plunge us into mysteries of the most marvellous kind. What can be more mysterious than the popular belief in the existence of matter and mind as entities absolutely independent of and yet coming in close and intimate relationship with each other? How does a totally alien thing called matter produce a knowledge of itself in a conscious mind? With the exposure of the most striking self-contradictions involved in the vulgar theory of matter and mind, I am not here

concerned. What I wish to insist upon is that the existence of the external world must not be taken for granted, as is usually done, in order simply to state the *manner* in which the individual mind gains a knowledge of it, but that the philosopher must dive deeper in order to reach an ultimate principle which will explain both the inner and the outer world. An exhaustive inquiry must be undertaken into the nature and meaning of knowledge and reality. Nothing short of such an inquiry will lead us to the central unity of Godhead for whom and in whom the universe exists.

I begin by stating the doctrine of the identity of thought and being the doctrine which holds that there can be no reality apart from the synthetic unity of intelligence or thought. The vulgar notion that matter is an inert dead substance absolutely independent and opposite of thought, is the outcome of that habit of abstract thinking which has unfortunately been the fruitful source of endless and tiresome controversies in the philosophical world. It is necessary to explain briefly what abstract thinking means. We very often make logical distinctions for the convenience of thought between things which do not *exist* apart from each other. Clearness, accuracy and precision of thought demand that we should closely investigate the nature

and peculiarity of each member of a united whole. Analysis is an indispensable instrument of correct thinking. It is not to be supposed, however, that a thing can exist independently of its context, because it can be distinguished from it and separately considered. Logical distinction does not mean objective separation. We can distinguish one end of a stick from another, but we cannot make any absolute separation between them. A stick having only one end is unknown in creation. Page No 1 of a leaf is distinguishable from page No 2, indeed the one is in a sense quite opposite of the other, but the two mutually imply each other and have existence only in their unity. By no effort of the imagination, is it possible to conceive a one-paged leaf. The case is similar with what in common parlance is called matter and mind. Mind or spirit is perfectly distinguishable from matter, but still they exist only in virtue of their mutual relation. It is the vicious habit of abstract thinking that leads us to suppose that matter would exist even if there were no trace of intelligence in the universe. Independent, self-sufficient matter is as meaningless and chimerical as a one-paged leaf or a circle without centre. What has been said of matter is equally true of mind. If the former is an abstraction except in relation to the latter and

has being and truth in and for it alone, the latter also depends for its self-realisation upon the former. The universe is centred in a conscious unity of intelligence and the conscious unity of intelligence realises itself in the universe. The one is closely related to and inseparable from the other.

The material world, as we know it, is full of order, harmony and symmetry. There is no place for chance or accident in it. Every minute part of this vast universe conditions and is conditioned by every other part of it equally minute, which together, make up the grand total of creation. The material world is a world constituted by relations. Relations form its backbone without which it could not possibly be what it is. Apart from these relations there would be nothing but a perfect chaos. The objection that these relations do not *constitute* the universe, but are simply super-imposed upon a crude matter, so as to render it orderly and intelligible, is perfectly futile. All that we know of the external world is that it is a system of intelligible relations. What may it be without them, it is impossible for us to tell. The existence of the external world presupposes these relations. Such a thing as crude matter is quite an Abracadabra for us. A somewhat detailed examination of some

of these relations will, it is hoped, make the subject clear.

The material world exists in time and space. These two are the forms that are presupposed in the existence of every external object. We cannot think of an object as not existing in space, nor can we conceive of an event as not occurring in time. It is possible to eliminate one quality after another of an object, but its position in space is that which must ultimately remain. Similarly, we may refuse to attribute definiteness to an event, but its being in time is that which we cannot think away; otherwise it would not be an event at all. Time and space are the *conditio sine qua non* of the existence of the material world. But what are time and space? A slight reflection is sufficient to show that space is the relation of the mutual externality of objects and their parts, and time is the relation of the succession of events. Now, no object can be conceived as existing, unless it is distinguished from other objects. Every definite something implies the negation of it. The pen with which I write can be known only as distinguished from some other object, from the inkstand or the table, for example, which again is known in distinction from some other object or objects. *This implies that, such implies not-such.* Distinction, mutual opposi-

tion is the inmost vitality of every form of qualitative determinateness. If there were no possibility of discrimination and mutual comparison, the knowledge of objects would be impossible and experience reduced to a meaningless blur. "To be real" says Professor Wallace "it is necessary to be somewhat—to limit and define. This is the necessity of finitude: in order to be anything more and higher there must come first of all a determinate being and reality. But reality implies negation: it implies limiting, distinction and opposition. Everything finite, every somewhat has something else to counteract, narrow and thwart it. This is the price to be paid for rising into reality and coming to be somewhat: there is always a somewhat else to be minded. The very point which makes a somewhat as above a mere nothing is its determinateness: and determinateness is at least negation and limit. Now the limit of a thing is that point where it begins to be somewhat else: where it passes out of itself and yields to another. Accordingly as limited, as determined, somewhat must pass over into another: it must be altered and become somewhat else. Thus a something implies for its being the being of somewhat else: its being is as it were adjectival,—it is dependent, finite and alterable. Such is the character of determinate being. Somewhat-

ness is always being for somewhat else." The existence of every external object depending upon its exclusion from other objects, it follows that space cannot be eliminated from outward things cognisable by us. For, what is space but the mutual exclusion of objects and their parts? Determinate existence = existence external to some other existence, and the relation of mutual externality is space. Without the cognition of space, therefore, we cannot cognise realities external to us. To know a thing is to know it *along with* some other thing and to know that other thing is to know it *along with* a third something and so on. In perceiving external objects, therefore, we must hold several objects and their parts together. Or, to express the same idea in a different way, we must go on adding parts to parts and wholes to wholes. That is to say, our perception must be *in* space. But what is implied in this process of combining parts of an object with its other parts, and the object itself with other objects? In every such combination, there is presupposed an integrating principle, which must refer to itself at each step, as it goes on adding parts to parts. Without such a principle referring to itself, there can be no synthesis at all. It has been shown before, that in order to be, an object must be distinguished from other objects, but there can be

no distinction unless the object distinguished and those from which it is distinguished are held together by a *single* unifying principle. Suppose *a, b, c, d, e*, are five external things existing in virtue of their distinction from each other. It is clear that each of these must be present to an integrating principle which holds these together and opposes them one to another. If in passing from *a* to *b*, *a* were altogether forgotten, it could not be distinguished from *b*, if *b* and *c* were not factors in a higher unity, in being distinguished from each other, they could not be so distinguished at all. Now, it is evident that this combining principle can not be any of the objects held together and distinguished from each other. That which distinguishes must be above those things that are distinguished. In other words, the combining or unifying principle must transcend and be equally present to the objects combined. It is not to be supposed, however, that this unifying principle would exist, even if there were nothing to be unified. In fact, the unifying principle and the objects which it unifies and distinguishes from each other, and thereby arranges them in the form of space, are one and the same thing looked at from two opposite points of view. They are the two sides of one and the same reality. As the objects excluding each other and consequent-

ly existing in space, presuppose a unifying principle, so does the unifying principle exist through relation to the objects which it unifies and distinguishes from each other. Without a principle to unify them, objects in space would not exist and the unifying principle would not exist without the objects existing in space, which it unifies.

Now, what is this unifying principle? The answer is, it is the unity of self-consciousness, or mind. The enduring unity of self-consciousness which we call the ego, fulfils all the conditions of a combining and discriminating agency. Besides the ego, we are neither familiar with nor can conceive any other unity involved in the mutual relation of objects. If, inspite of this, anybody chooses to call this synthetic unity by any name other than ego, soul or spirit, he is at liberty to do so. A rose under another name smells as sweet. Whatever name may be given to this unity, it is certain that it is impossible to conceive it as anything other than mind.

We thus see, that except in relation to the unity of self-consciousness, the spatial world cannot exist. It is the unity of self-consciousness that constitutes space by holding together objects and their parts. To know an external object is, in the first place, to put together its parts and, in the second

place, to distinguish it from other objects. Now, in each of these processes, a continual reference to an abiding principle that unifies, is implied. No outward thing can exist except in space, that is to say, without being distinguished from other things; and no distinction of things from each other is possible without their being equally present and related to a combining agency, that is, to a self or mind. The existence, therefore, of the extended world outside us implies the unity of self-consciousness. So far from thought and extension having nothing in-common, as the Cartesians held, there can be no extension without thought and no thought without extension. The extended world has necessary relation to mind or thought as the principle that puts its parts together and makes it *one*, and mind or thought goes out of itself to and realises itself in the extended world. A mind that does not so realise itself is a blank and a world that is not centred in mind is an inconceivable abstraction. Looking at the external world with unreflecting eyes, we see only one half of the complete reality. The other half which we do not see, but which gives being and reality to the experienced world by relating its parts in the form of space and in other ways is spirit.

What has been said of space is true also of time.

Time means a succession of events. Every moment of time owes its determinateness to its relation to other moments of time. As there can be no 'here', without a 'there', so there can be no 'now' without a 'then.' As space owes its origin to the mutual exclusion of objects held together by a common unifying principle, so, time results from the relating of events in the order of 'before' and 'after' by a principle that integrates the events. *Mere* succession is not equivalent to time. If there were nothing but a flow of events, there could be no knowledge of such a flow. Writers discussing the nature of time from the point of view of empirical psychology, have also come to see this. Mr. Sully says in his "Outlines of Psychology."—"The representation of time begins with the recognition of two successive experiences as successive. This is more than the mere fact of succession. It implies an act of reflection upon the succeeding presentations, and a representation of them together at the same moment as successive" It is the unity of self-consciousness that relates the succeeding events to the preceding ones, without itself being any one of them. When an event passes away the idea of it must persist in the mind, and it must be brought into relation to the events that come after. Only in this way does the representation of time arise.

Now, such an act of relating would be impossible without a combining agency that over-reaches the events brought into relation to each other. The self or mind is, at it were, the chord that binds events to each other and forms them into a series. The existence of time, we thus see, is made possible by the unity of self-consciousness not in time. We should not, however, commit the mistake of supposing that mind is an entity existing independently of the events which it relates to each other. Nor should we imagine that events come first to the mind as unrelated particulars and are subsequently related by it to each other in the form of time. There is such a thing as time only in virtue of the necessary relation of the events in it to self. On the other hand, the knowledge of self is developed *along with* the knowledge of time. Time, as a succession of events, refers itself to self-consciousness as its other and the unity of the self preserves its identity through its relation to passing events. Here, as elsewhere, there is a necessary correlativity between time and self. For, what meaning could permanence have, if it were not the other of change, and how could change be possible if there were not a principle conscious of itself as permanent, in the midst of changes? The existence of time is not possible apart from relation to self, any more than the iden-

tity of self is possible except in relation to the stream of events forming time.

The world existing in time and space has, therefore, a necessary relation to the synthetic unity of self-consciousness. If we are to think of external objects as existing in space and events as occurring in time, we must regard them as related to the unity of mind. The mutual externality of objects and their parts and the succession of events have their antecedent condition in mind. Indeed, we may say that mind goes out of itself to the extended world in order to realise itself and the extended world becomes conscious of itself in mind. It is an abstract view to regard the spatial and temporal world as a *res completa*. For, space, as we have seen, owes its origin to the putting together of objects and their parts and time to the binding of passing events to each other and such a process of synthesis implies a unifying principle that must always remain identical with itself. If, then, we recognise the existence of time and space, we must at the same time recognise the existence of mind which makes them possible, as their necessary *correlatum*. Or, if we hold by the common view that the external world is complete in itself, we must eliminate time and space from it. But the effect of taking away time and space from the

material world, if such an operation were possible, would be that it would be reduced to a chaotic mass of unrelated particulars uncognisable by thought. We must not, therefore, think of abstracting time and space from the world around us, inasmuch as they are indispensably necessary to its existence ; but time and space are made possible only by the unity of self. Either, therefore, we must give *nothing* to the world or give it *everything* including the self. The truth is that mind and matter are complementary to each other and have existence in virtue of their mutual relation. The material world, regarded as independent of mind, is in contradiction with itself. Ordinary understanding looks at one half of the total reality and ignores the other half presupposed in it. Mind is not something alien to matter, externally brought into relation to it, but is its own complement. On the other hand, matter is nothing but the *content* of mind or spirit. We have seen that time and space are the inmost essence of the material world without which it would not exist, and that the unity of self is the combining principle that by bringing together objects and isolated moments of time, produces the continuous unities of time and space. The existence of mind, again, depends upon the existence of the multiplicity of objects and

events which it reduces to unity by relating them to each other. The mind is a unity of diversity and if there were no diversity and multiplicity there would not also be such a unity. The unity of the ego thus presupposes a multiplicity of objects and the multiplicity of objects presuppose a relating and unifying ego. The essence of the ego being synthetic activity, it exists in virtue of its combining objects into the unity of the world. The mind becomes conscious of its unity with itself through the process by which it relates objects and events to each other according to the forms of time and space, and thereby makes the world one. The unity of the world, therefore, is the counterpart of the mind's unity with itself. The relation of the synthetic unity of self-consciousness to the world of mutually excluding objects and events is the same as that of the centre to the circumference. The unity of thought goes out to the multiplicity of being and the multiplicity of being centre themselves in the unity of thought. Both are indispensable factors of an organic whole. All reality finds its truth and meaning in the unity of an intelligent self-conscious mind.

I now pass on to the consideration of three other principles *viz.* those of substance, causality and reciprocity. These are the principles that are

of the utmost importance to physical science, for, without them physical science cannot move a single step. We have seen that time and space are the forms of unity that are presupposed in our knowledge of the external world. But besides time and space the categories of substance, causality and reciprocity are involved in the possibility of experience. A world that is not substantial, the changes of which are not related to each other as cause and effect and the objects of which do not determine each other, is wholly beyond the scope of our imagination. The principles of substance causality and reciprocity, which scientific men must use in interpreting the world from their point of view, lie also at the basis of experience. Men of science only bring to light what is involved in the existence of nature.

Now, what is the principle of substance? It may be stated in Kants' language thus—"In all change of phenomena the substance is permanent and the quantity of it in nature is never either increased or diminished." Assuming that changes are constantly taking place in the world around us, we have to show the possibility of such changes. Now, a slight reflection will make it clear to us that changes are possible only in relation to a permanent object that does not itself change. For,

changes must be changes *of* some thing. Changes could not be cognised by us if they were not referred to a permanent ground. Passing events, in order to be known as such, must be related to each other, but such a relation is possible only in so far as the successive phenomena are determined as states of a permanent object. The very notion of change implies change from some previous state of an object. A consequent phenomenon owes its existence to its relation to an antecedent phenomenon. All successive phenomena, therefore, in order to be anything real, must be closely connected with each other, but in such a connection there is presupposed a permanent substance identical with itself. It should be observed that no attempt is made here to answer the question, *Why* should there be changes in the world? The existence of changes is simply assumed. Now granting that there are changes in nature, our business is to answer the question, how these changes can be known? It has been said that changes, in order to be intelligible, must be referred to a permanent substance. It is not possible to think of changes except as necessarily connected with each other and it is in virtue of their being related to a permanent object, which through all changes maintains its unity with itself, that they are so connected.

The second part of Kants' enunciation of the principle of substance follows directly from the first part of it. To say that substance maintains its unity with itself through all changes, is the same thing as to say that the total quantity of matter in nature can neither be increased nor diminished. Whatever changes may take place in the universe, the quantity of matter remains the same, because a permanent substance is presupposed in all changes. The change is only in phenomena and not in their substratum, and hence it cannot be affected by the change. The scientific doctrine of the indestructibility of matter has, therefore, its justification in the principle which makes changes possible. It is impossible to prove *empirically* that matter is indestructible. The utmost that empirical reasoning justifies us to say, is that as yet not a particle of matter has been known to be destroyed. But there is a vast difference between a necessity of thought and a belief engendered by invariable experience. The real proof of the scientific theory that the quantity of matter in nature is never either increased or diminished is to be found in the principle of substance, which explains the possibility of changes in the external world. The proof, therefore, of the indestructibility of matter is not empirical but transcendental. If

there were a possibility of the total quantity of matter being either increased or diminished, experience itself would be impossible, because there would be no cognition of changes at all.

The mistake, however, should not be committed that because changes imply a permanent substance, such a substance is a predicateless identity lying behind phenomena. The substance with which alone we are concerned is not the unknown and unknowable *substratum* of Locke and others but a principle of identity that through all changes remains one with itself. But, as there can be no changes that are not related to a permanent substance, so there can be no substance which does not go out of itself to changes. A colourless self-contained substance is a fiction of the mind, just as changes unrelated to substance are meaningless abstractions. To be conscious of changes, to put an intelligible meaning into them, it is necessary to refer them to a permanent principle and to assign a definite meaning to substance, to save it from being a *caput mortuum* of abstraction, we must regard it as the correlative of change. In short, substance is but the other of change and change is but the other of substance. If we inveigh against Heraclitus for his holding the doctrine that there are nothing but changes in

the universe, we must at the same time perceive the baselessness of the theory of Parmenides and Zeno, who held by a permanent immutable being and denied change. The truth is that substance must be conceived as a connecting principle of changes and not as a predicate-less unity which would remain even if there existed no successive phenomena to be linked to each other. That is to say, substance is not an entity that excludes change and difference from it, but the inner *nexus* that brings a consequent event into relation to its antecedent. An inquiry into the possibility of changes led us to refer them to a persistent substance. Now an inquiry into the nature of substance results in our finding that it is not a quality-less entity, or the unknowable *substratum* of perceptible phenomena, but the principle that necessarily connects successive events one to another. In other words, philosophical reflection leads us on from the principle of substance to the principle of causality. For, the law of causality is nothing but the law that compels us to regard a consequent event as necessarily related to its antecedent.

Before proceeding to discuss the principle of causality, it is necessary to consider the principle of substance in a different bearing. We have seen that substance is correlative to change and change to

substance. But such a correlation can be seen only from a point of view which is higher than both. This higher point of view is self-consciousness. Substance going out of itself to changes and changes referring themselves to substance as their permanent ground, presuppose a principle which transcends and comprehends them. That which is one of the two terms of a relation cannot be *conscious* of the relation; for, in order to be conscious of anything, it is necessary to go beyond it. It is mind, then, that supplies the conception or category of substance with which phenomena are attached to each other. As the forms of time and space in which objects and events are disposed and arranged, and which may be said to be the basal qualities of nature without which it would not exist, are two of the synthetic principles with which the mind makes knowledge possible, so is substance a category or thought-determination implied in the possibility of the knowledge of change and so of experience. The mind is the source of the synthetic principles which constitute experience by relating objects and events to each other.

The foregoing consideration ought to remove the popular prejudice against idealism. It is supposed that idealism reduces the world to an empty shadow by denying substantiality to it. From what

has been said above, it will be evident, that so far from idealism denying reality to the world, it proves that without thinking of a permanent substance underlying changing phenomena, it is not possible to have a knowledge of the external world at all. What idealism teaches is not that the world is not substantial, but that its very substantiality is possible in virtue of its being related to the unity of self-consciousness. In order to the possibility of experience, the mind must bring evanescent phenomena under the category of substance and thereby reduce them to changing states of a permanent world. The permanence and substantiality of the world is the analogue of the mind's unity with itself. From the point of view of common sense, it is possible only to asseverate the substantial reality of the world. No *proof* of the thesis can be offered. Idealism alone can supply it by showing that the category of substance is one of the synthetic principles with which the mind converts what would otherwise be a mass of unrelated and consequently unknowable particulars into the orderly and symmetrical unity of the world. The world is real *because* it is ideal, and idealism is true *because* it proves the reality of the world.

I have said that if we reflect on the category of substance, we cannot rest in it. The transition

from it to the principle of causality is inevitable. Now, what is a cause? To this query the scientific man would reply that the cause of a phenomenon is its invariable unconditional antecedent. The multifarious phenomena constituting the universe are related to each other as antecedent and consequent. The antecedents we call cause and the consequents effect. Beyond this, the scientific man does not go. His answer, *so far as it goes*, is undoubtedly correct. But the question is, is it sufficient? Is it enough to say that that which invariably goes before an event is its cause? Is our causal inquiry satisfied by the reference of a consequent phenomenon to its antecedent? An event that invariably goes before another event may not be its cause. Lightning invariably precedes thunder, but it is not the cause of thunder. Two events, in order to be related to each other as cause and effect, must be the successive states of the *same substance*. The identity of substance through all changes is essential to the causal relation. For, the principle of causality is but the principle of substance properly understood. We have not, however, completed the scientific account of the conception of causality by saying that the successive events related to each other as cause and effect presuppose a permanent substance. The antecedent phenomenon, in which we

seek the explanation of the consequent, being itself an event, stands in need of explanation. It must, therefore, be referred to its antecedent and so on *ad infinitum*. But, surely, reason cannot rest satisfied in this. It demands a principle which shall explain the series of phenomena without itself being any single term of the series or the totality of it, and which shall not stand in need of explanation. In short, reason demands a *final* not a *phenomenal* cause.

Where, then, is such a cause to be found? In the opinion of some philosophers, the infinite regress of phenomena must lead us ultimately to the unconditioned or the *noumenon*. They seem to think that God is at one end of the series of phenomena and is related to it as its originator. But it is impossible to maintain such a theory in face of Kant's refutation of it in his third and fourth "antinomies." A series of phenomena cannot be conceived as terminating. The antecedent, being *in time*, must also be a consequent, that is to say, must have some other phenomenon related to it as its antecedent and so on *ad infinitum*. In short, a time-series cannot be conceived as ending. Such a supposition is inconsistent with the nature of time. But let us, in spite of this, suppose that the series of phenomena conducts us to an unconditioned being. Such

there were a possibility of the total quantity of matter being either increased or diminished, experience itself would be impossible, because there would be no cognition of changes at all.

The mistake, however, should not be committed that because changes imply a permanent substance, such a substance is a predicateless identity lying behind phenomena. The substance with which alone we are concerned is not the unknown and unknowable *substratum* of Locke and others but a principle of identity that through all changes remains one with itself. But, as there can be no changes that are not related to a permanent substance, so there can be no substance which does not go out of itself to changes. A colourless self-contained substance is a fiction of the mind, just as changes unrelated to substance are meaningless abstractions. To be conscious of changes, to put an intelligible meaning into them, it is necessary to refer them to a permanent principle and to assign a definite meaning to substance, to save it from being a *caput mortuum* of abstraction, we must regard it as the correlative of change. In short, substance is but the other of change and change is but the other of substance. If we inveigh against Heráclitus for his holding the doctrine that there are nothing but changes in

the universe, we must at the same time perceive the baselessness of the theory of Parmenides and Zeno, who held by a permanent immutable being and denied change. The truth is that substance must be conceived as a connecting principle of changes and not as a predicate-less unity which would remain even if there existed no successive phenomena to be linked to each other. That is to say, substance is not an entity that excludes change and difference from it, but the inner *nexus* that brings a consequent event into relation to its antecedent. An inquiry into the possibility of changes led us to refer them to a persistent substance. Now an inquiry into the nature of substance results in our finding that it is not a quality-less entity, or the unknowable *substratum* of perceptible phenomena, but the principle that necessarily connects successive events one to another. In other words, philosophical reflection leads us on from the principle of substance to the principle of causality. For, the law of causality is nothing but the law that compels us to regard a consequent event as necessarily related to its antecedent.

Before proceeding to discuss the principle of causality, it is necessary to consider the principle of substance in a different bearing. We have seen that substance is correlative to change and change to

substance. But such a correlation can be seen only from a point of view which is higher than both. This higher point of view is self-consciousness. Substance going out of itself to changes and changes referring themselves to substance as their permanent ground, presuppose a principle which transcends and comprehends them. That which is one of the two terms of a relation cannot be *conscious*, of the relation; for, in order to be conscious of anything, it is necessary to go beyond it. It is mind, then, that supplies the conception or category of substance with which phenomena are attached to each other. As the forms of time and space in which objects and events are disposed and arranged, and which may be said to be the basal qualities of nature without which it would not exist, are two of the synthetic principles with which the mind makes knowledge possible, so is substance a category or thought-determination implied in the possibility of the knowledge of change and so of experience. The mind is the source of the synthetic principles which constitute experience by relating objects and events to each other.

The foregoing consideration ought to remove the popular prejudice against idealism. It is supposed that idealism reduces the world to an empty shadow by denying substantiality to it. From what

has been said above, it will be evident, that so far from idealism denying reality to the world, it proves that without thinking of a permanent substance underlying changing phenomena, it is not possible to have a knowledge of the external world at all. What idealism teaches is not that the world is not substantial, but that its very substantiality is possible in virtue of its being related to the unity of self-consciousness. In order to the possibility of experience, the mind must bring evanescent phenomena under the category of substance and thereby reduce them to changing states of a permanent world. The permanence and substantiality of the world is the analogue of the mind's unity with itself. From the point of view of common sense, it is possible only to asseverate the substantial reality of the world. No *proof* of the thesis can be offered. Idealism alone can supply it by showing that the category of substance is one of the synthetic principles with which the mind converts what would otherwise be a mass of unrelated and consequently unknowable particulars into the orderly and symmetrical unity of the world. The world is real *because* it is ideal, and idealism is true *because* it proves the reality of the world.

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a being can be related to the series of phenomena in two ways. It must either form a part of the series or exist outside it. Both cases are impossible. That which forms a part of a time-series cannot be unconditioned. For, to be *in time* is to be conditioned. To say that an unconditioned being forms a part of a series of phenomena, is to say, that the unconditioned is conditioned, which is absurd. Neither can the unconditioned being exist outside the series of phenomena and yet be related to it as its cause. For, as Kant says, "this cause as the highest member in the series of the causes of cosmical changes, must originate or begin the existence of the latter and their series. In this case, it must also begin to act, and its causality would, therefore, belong to time and consequently to the sum-total of phenomena, that is to the world; which is contradictory to the hypothesis." The attempt then to find an unconditioned being as the cause of the series of phenomena either within, at the end of or outside the series seems utterly hopeless. In the unbroken chain of phenomena no supernatural element can be introduced. Very truly does Green observe: "The scientific impulse traces the determination of event by event in a series to which it finds neither beginning nor end; so that to those who have fancied that, if the course of events could be follow-

ed by memory far enough back or by a prophetic vision far enough forward, it would lead to a Divine act of creation or completion, science seems to make God disappear. An antecedent in time which has itself had no antecedent, a consequent in time which should have no further consequent are found to be impossibilities."

How are we, then, to get out of the dilemma? On the one hand, we find that an infinite regress of phenomena does not give an adequate answer to our causal inquiry. On the other, we see that the series of phenomena can never lead us to an unconditioned being either within or outside the series. Kant himself puts us on the track of the solution of the difficulty. I extract the following passages from the very suggestive section of the *Critique of Pure Reason* entitled "Possibility of freedom in harmony with the universal law of natural necessity: "Every sensuous object possesses an *empirical* character, which guarantees that its actions, as phenomena stand in complete and harmonious connection, conformably to unvarying natural laws, with all other phenomena and can be deduced from these, as conditions, and that they do thus, in connection with these constitute a series in the order of nature." The sensuous object must, in the second place, possess an intelligible

character, which guarantees it to be the cause of those actions as phenomena, although it is not itself a phenomenon nor subordinate to the conditions of the world of sense.....Now this active subject would, in its character of intelligible subject, be subordinate to no conditions of time, for time is only a condition of phenomena.....In virtue of its empirical character, this subject would at the same time be subordinate to the empirical laws of causality and as a phenomenon and member of the sensuous world its effects would have to be accounted for by a reference to preceding phenomena.....In virtue of its intelligible character on the other hand, the subject must be regarded as free from all sensuous influences, and from all phenomenal determination." These conceptions were not properly developed by Kant. He failed, to reconcile natural necessity with freedom in any real way. Properly developed, these suggestive hints thrown out by Kant would amount to the following.

The succession of phenomena in time related to each other as cause and effect, besides presupposing a permanent substance as the ground of the phenomena, implies a unity of consciousness not in time, which supplies the conception of substance. The antecedent called cause is not some-

thing absolutely detached from the consequent termed effect. The latter is given *through* the former, that is to say, the conception of it can only be possible if the antecedent, which as a sensible phenomenon in time ceases to exist before the consequent event happens, is yet carried forward to it. Suppose *a, b, c, d* are terms of a series of phenomena related to each other as cause and effect. *A*, no doubt, ceases to exist when *b* happens, *b* when *c* happens and so on. But if there had been an absolute break between the cessation of *a* and the origination of *b*, no conception of *a, b, c, d* forming a series would have been possible. Such a conception implies the carrying forward of the *idea* of *a*, when it ceases to exist as a sensible reality to *b*, of the idea of *b* to *c* and so on. In fact, it is one and the same substance that now appears as *a*, then as *b* and again as *c*. But such a connection between phenomena, however, through which alone the conception of them as forming a series is possible, implies a synthetic unity of consciousness involved in but not forming a part of the series. The sequences of natural phenomena, therefore, presuppose a unity of self-consciousness making such sequences possible. Such a unity of self-consciousness cannot, of course, be itself a part of the series of phenome-

na, but as that which makes it possible must distinguish itself from, although implied in it. The existence of nature as a connected whole implies a non-natural principle as its necessary *correlatum*.

Such a conception does not invalidate the scientific definition of cause as an invariable unconditional antecedent. This definition is, as I have said, true so far as it goes. The attempt to complete it by postulating the existence of a supreme unconditioned being at one end of or altogether outside the series of phenomena is, as we have seen, absurd. The true solution of the problem is to be found in the answer to the question, "How is a series of phenomena, the terms of which are related to each other as antecedent and consequent, cause and effect, possible?" The answer is that only mind or self-consciousness can make such a series possible. The claim of the scientific man to explain a consequent event by pointing out its antecedent must be held valid. His theory is not to be *contradicted* but *transcended*. No one blames or should blame the scientific man for refusing to move a single step beyond phenomena. The real mischief arises when he pretends that *his* explanation of the universe is "the final explanation, and when he rather audaciously meddles with subjects,

with which his imperfect method is incompetent to deal.

We have seen that each succeeding term of a series of phenomena exists in virtue of its vital connection with its antecedent, that a series of phenomena must be an unbroken unity, and that such a series is made possible by the presence of self to each member and to the whole of the series. The relation of phenomena to each other as cause and effect in a time-series, implies a synthetic unity of consciousness in the back-ground. In a time-series, the antecedent conditions its consequent. The consequent exists through its antecedent, which is its cause. But the antecedent in conditioning its consequent is itself conditioned by it. Two events related to each other as antecedent and consequent, cause and effect, must be mutual determinants. An antecedent event, in order to be so, must have a consequent, and a consequent event must in its turn, depend for its reality on its antecedent. The two, in fact, are organic members of *one* reality. The cause *is* the effect and the effect *is* the cause. In a time-series *a, b, c, d*, for example, in which each succeeding term is related to its antecedent as its effect, *a* determines *b*, *b* determines *c* and so on; that is to say, *b* depends for its existence on *a*, *c* on *b*, *d* on *c*.

But is not the opposite of this as much true? If the existence of b depends on a , does not that of a depend equally on b ? The existence of a , in its character as antecedent and cause, *ipso facto* implies its consequent and effect b . We thus see that in a series of phenomena, related to each other as cause and effect, the terms must necessarily be mutual determinants. "We say", says Hegel, "that a cause is a cause, only when it has an effect, and *vice versa*. Both cause and effect are one and the same content." The principle of causality, therefore, necessarily leads us on to the principle of reciprocity.

We may help the transition from causality to reciprocity in a different way. It has been seen before that the existence of an object presupposes the existence of other objects from which it is distinguished. In other words, all objects must exist in space. Every object has its determinateness, its peculiar qualities by means of the relations which it bears to other objects, with which it is held together in *one* space. Every object gets its qualification from other objects and qualifies them in return. So, a change in the relations in which an object stands to other objects means a change in the relations in which those objects stand to it. For example, a change in a 's relations

to *b, c, d*, is *ipso facto* a change in *b, c, d*'s relations to *a*. That is to say, *a* affects *b, c, d*, in being affected by them. All changes, therefore, presuppose a reciprocal determination of objects. The successive states of an object, which are related to each other as cause and effect, are due to changes in its relations to other objects. Hence, a substance in undergoing changes gives rise to changes in other substances. The relation of causality depends upon the relation of reciprocity. If there existed only one object—such an object, however, for reasons given in the preceding pages cannot exist—in the universe, it could not possibly undergo changes. "Change," says Professor Caird, "can be conceived only as an alternation of substances in their relation to other substances, and all causation is external. And in a single substance conceived as existing by itself, or in the world as a whole, we cannot conceive of any change as taking place." The law of causality has "necessary relation," I quote Prof. Caird again, "to the law of reciprocity, which simply means that as all change is relative, it must be equally attributed to both terms in the relation. If we regard the change as only in one substance, we are simply attending to one term and abstracting from the other."

It has been seen that the scientific conception of cause as an invariable unconditional antecedent is true so far as it goes, that the relation of antecedence and consequence, cause and effect, is made possible by the unity of self-consciousness and that the category of causality properly developed leads us to the category of reciprocity or to the conception of objects as mutual determinants. A series of phenomena, the terms of which are related to each other as cause and effect, implies the unity of the self over-reaching it as its necessary *correlatum*. The same is true of things reciprocally determined. When we say that objects determine each other, we implicitly assume that they are present to a unifying consciousness, holding them together. Were there absolute gaps between the substances determining each other, *no* relation between them would be possible. The denial of a principle comprehending the plurality of reciprocally determining objects, of identity *in* differences, is the denial of the relation of reciprocity as of all other relations. What can be the meaning of the statement that *a, b, c, d* for instance, determine each other, unless it is implied that they are present to the unity of the self over-reaching them? Differences presuppose identity. *Mere* difference is a meaningless abstraction. In speaking of objects determin-

ing each other, we postulate a unity of consciousness comprehending them. It is because self-consciousness underlies them that the mutual determination of things becomes possible. Apart from relation to a unifying principle, plurality has no meaning. Differentiation implies a simultaneous process of integration. Identity and difference, unity and plurality imply each other and are true only through their mutual relation. Separate the one from the other and the result is an empty abstraction. A unifying consciousness is the inseparable correlative of the multifarious objects of nature related to each other reciprocally and in other ways.

But if objects existing in space and determining each other have no meaning apart from a unifying consciousness, the unifying consciousness itself depends for its existence upon the objects which it unifies. It is a unity *of* differences and exists *through* them. A unity of consciousness which unifies nothing is an absurdity. As the multifarious objects of nature refer themselves to self-consciousness, so does self-consciousness realise *itself* in them. It manifests itself in the diverse objects of nature and from them returns to its own unity. It is, in other words, a unity which comprehends all differences within itself. It is this idea that

Hegel seeks to express by the following statement, which has proved quite unintelligible to many : "The reality is the universal, which goes out of itself, particularises itself, opposes itself to itself, that it may reach the deepest and most comprehensive unity with itself." Translated into plainer language, it simply means that nature is the manifestation of a self-conscious being through whose differences it maintains its unity with itself. Self-consciousness, which is the final explanation of nature, differentiates itself and *through* these differences reaches the deepest unity with itself.

It will not be difficult now to understand the meaning of Hegel's *dictum*, "the truth of necessity is freedom." If we confine our attention to the phenomena of nature alone, we shall find nothing but necessity. The objects of nature are necessarily related to each other in space and time. The laws of nature are inviolable, to the operations of which nowhere can any exception be found. Indeed, the fundamental laws of nature are nothing but the principles of the understanding which constitute nature, and if there were any exception to their operation, experience could not be possible. "Under the acknowledged reign of law, the world is a connected drama in which there is no place for episodes." But what after all are the objects of

nature, so necessarily related to each other? We have seen that they are but the expression of self-consciousness. Seen in this light, do not the objects of nature necessarily determining each other, appear as the self-determination of the unifying consciousness that makes nature as a connected whole possible? Let us illustrate our meaning by an example. A, b, c, d , are certain objects of nature related to each other necessarily. But they are the expression of an ultimate unity of consciousness, P. P is as much a as b , as much b , as c , and so on. So that in saying that a determines b , b determines c and so on, we are simply saying that P determines itself by itself. In the language of Professor Caird, we can say of the unifying principle of nature that, "in determining it determines *itself*, in producing differences it produces *itself* in them." The objects of nature are, no doubt, related to each other necessarily, but as they are the manifestation of self-consciousness, their necessary determination is *its* self-determination. The truth of necessity, therefore, is freedom.

The foregoing discussion of the principles of substance, causality and reciprocity may be briefly summarised in this way. Changes imply a permanent substance that undergoes change. No conception of change is possible unless it is referred

to substance. But as change presupposes substance, so does substance presuppose change. In other words, substance is the connecting principle of changes. From the principle of substance, it is necessary to pass on to the principle of causality. Cause is the antecedent to which a consequent event is necessarily related in consequence of their being the successive states of a permanent substance. That which is a cause in relation to its consequent is an effect in relation to its antecedent. A time-series cannot be conceived as ending; consequently, a first cause is a chimera. But the succession of events in time related to each other as cause and effect implies the unity of the self not in time. The causal relation, properly developed, leads us to the relation of reciprocity. In reciprocity, we reach the notion of things determining each other. But *mere* reciprocity is an abstraction. The reciprocal relation, like the causal relation, presupposes the unity of self-consciousness comprehending and over-reaching the mutually determining things. The unity of self-consciousness differentiates itself into a plurality of reciprocally determining things and from them returns to itself, thereby reaching "the deepest and most comprehensive unity with itself."

The preceding discussion has shown us that

the existence of the external world implies the relations of time, space, substance, causality and reciprocity. To take away these relations is to reduce nature to an unintelligible surd. Every object of nature, properly understood, is, as Green says, "a congeries of relations." If we patiently analyse our conception of matter we find that it is reduced to a statement of relations between objects and their parts. Abstract these relations and there is nothing left. What is knowable, what is within experience, must necessarily be conceived as a system of unalterable relations constituted by a single unifying principle. An object of experience must necessarily be constituted by certain definite relations, like those considered before, in which it stands to other objects of experience. To know such an object, to define it in intelligible terms, is to determine the place which it occupies in the "cosmos of experience." I see a tree. I could not know it, if I did not put together the parts of which it consists, in virtue of which synthesising act alone it becomes *one*, and distinguished it clearly from other known objects falling within a wider system of relations. All determination, as Spinoza says, is negation. But there could be no negation, if the facts negated and those from which they are negated were not held together and mutually

opposed ; *i e*, if they were not regarded as factors comprehended within "the one all-inclusive system of relations." Such a system of relations, however, being constituted by the putting together and the mutual determination of the units of experience—the units becoming units only in virtue of the relations into which they enter—presupposes a unifying principle, which is not itself a part of it. That which establishes relations between the objects of experience cannot itself be one of them. That which puts together and relates to each other the constituent elements of an object must be something to which these elements are equally present. It cannot itself be one of them ; otherwise it could not combine the parts into a single entity. If the material world, therefore, is a whole consisting of inter-related parts, if each of its constituent elements can be known only as standing in certain definite relations to the other constituent elements of it, if, in short, the material world is a single system of unalterable relations, then, it presupposes a unifying principle, a mind over-reaching it but not beyond it. The material world, as I have already said, is only one-half of the complete reality of which the other half is spirit.

Now, ordinary understanding is not *conscious* of the relations which make the existence of nature

possible and in virtue of which it is united with self-consciousness. It is one thing to *unconsciously* make use of these relations and another to be *reflectively* aware of them. They lie at the basis of the experience of even the idiot. The very possibility of experience presupposes them. It is science that first brings these principles to light. That every event must have a cause, that in all change the quantity of matter remains the same, that objects of nature existing in space determine each other, are principles, the explicit formulation of which belongs to science, though common experience would be impossible without them. Scientific men discover these principles involved in all experience and *consciously* determine objects by them. Ordinary understanding thinks that the objects of nature are quite independent of each other, though they co-exist in space. Science removes this illusion by pointing out that every object stands in necessary relations to the others. But, we find a curious see-saw in the arguments of scientific men. Sometimes they lay so much stress on the laws of nature that phenomena are reduced almost to the vanishing point. At other times, all importance is attached to phenomena, and laws are regarded as mere statements in general terms of the order visible in nature. The cause of this lies

in the fact that the categories with which scientific men deal are the categories of reflexion. Laws of nature are meaningless abstractions apart from phenomena of which they are the laws, and phenomena undetermined by laws are figments of the imagination. Now, it is the latter truth that scientific men seem most often to forget. They see clearly enough that laws abstracted from phenomena have no meaning, but they fail to perceive that phenomena could not exist if they were not determined by laws. Now, the merit of first calling attention to this great truth belongs to Kant. He showed that sense undetermined by the principles of the understanding cannot yield knowledge. The fundamental laws of nature are the principles with which self-consciousness determines the raw materials furnished by sense and converts them into cognisable objects held together in the unity of the world. Kant also showed that the correlativity of perception and conception implies the unity of a permanent self. Kant, it will be seen, completed and corrected the scientific doctrine in two ways. In the first place, he proved that as laws of nature apart from phenomena are abstractions, so phenomena undetermined by the laws of nature are non-entities. In the second place, he avoided the see-saw of science by making

self-consciousness the key by which to unlock the secrets of the world. Laws and phenomena being real only through their mutual relation, the transition in thought from the one to the other is inevitable. Such an alternation can be avoided only by leading both up to a principle that comprehends and transcends them. Such a principle is the unity of the self. In other words, the categories of reflexion must be reinterpreted and their defects corrected from a higher standpoint which is the unity of thought with itself. Kant's theory, however, has its own defects. While showing that the existence of nature, governed by unchangeable laws, implies the unity of the self as its necessary *correlatum*, he omitted to point out the opposite truth that nature is the manifestation of self-consciousness. In Kant's system, the unity of self-consciousness lies on one side, and the manifold of sense on the other, and he conceived of knowledge as the product of the combination of these two elements. Kant's philosophy, therefore, does not altogether emancipate itself from dualism, though, undoubtedly, it goes far in that direction. It was Hegel who completed the Kantian philosophy, and made it consistent with itself by showing the correlativity of intelligence and nature. Thought goes out of itself to nature and

realises itself in it, and comes back to itself as self-conscious spirit. To express the same idea in a different way, nature is but the externalisation of thought and thought is but the internalisation of nature. Reason creates the relative distinction between mind and nature, subject and object and overcomes it. Self-consciousness is the ultimate category in which alone thought can finally rest and which comprehends the lower and less perfect categories within itself. "The intelligence," as Professor Caird says, "when it once begins to define an object for itself finds itself launched upon a movement of self-asserting synthesis, in which it cannot stop till it has recognised that the unity of the object with itself involves its unity with all other objects and with the mind that knows it. Hence whatever we begin by saying, we must ultimately say, 'mind.' The idea of self-consciousness may be truly said to contain all the categories which the self-conscious subject can apply to any object; or these categories may be regarded simply as different steps in the movement by which thought, through determination of its object, comes to a consciousness of itself."

We have seen that the existence of the material world implies relations. We have also seen that such relations imply self-consciousness or mind

which makes them possible. But the important question now comes, what mind is this? Is the mind which gives reality to the universe, my own individual mind? Am I, then, after all, the creator, preserver and centre of this universe? Did the world first come into existence when I saw the light and shall it end with my death? If such really be the ultimate conclusion to which the profoundest philosophy leads us, sensible and sober-minded men will have nothing to do with it. They will not be prepared to give up the reality of this grand and magnificent universe for the sake of a terrible wisdom like this. The world, indeed, refuses to be philosophised away in so summary a manner. But, happily, we are not reduced to such a strait. The same philosophy, which teaches the spirituality of the universe, also proclaims the reality of it.

The simplest reason why our finite mind cannot be regarded as the central principle of the universe is that it itself requires explanation. To us, the universe does not appear as "the one all-inclusive system of relations", as it must do to a consciousness eternal and complete. It is also notorious that our consciousness has had a beginning in time. There was a time when we did not exist; our existence began at a definite moment of time. If we were to take up the stand-point of

subjective idealism, there would be no other alternative for us than to hold that the external world, with all that it contains, first came into existence at that moment of time, when our finite existence also began ; and this involves a *hysteron proteron*. To mark off a definite period in time presupposes a discriminating consciousness which marks off and distinguishes such a period from the periods previous to it. To assign a definite date to the occurrence of a particular event, implies a knowledge of other moments of time, from which the definite date in question is marked off and distinguished, which again presupposes a unity of consciousness that compares and distinguishes them. The coming into existence of our finite self is an *event* in time and as such implies a higher consciousness which is not an event of time and is beyond it. The act of distinguishing events in time presupposes the unity of self-consciousness which is not in time and which unifies, past and present. When I say, for example, that I did so and so three years ago, I assume myself to be the self same "I" that existed three years ago and that exists now. So far as these three years are concerned, I am beyond them as an element common to them. Let us now take a more comprehensive view. Inasmuch as the fact of my coming into

existence at some particular moment of time, say 26 years ago, is an event, it implies previous events from which this particular event is distinguished and to which, it is brought into relation. This particular event has reality only through distinction from other events. But such a distinction, comparison and consequently the unification of events, implies a permanent unity of consciousness which compares, distinguishes and unifies them, which is common to all, but confined to none of them. Clearly this distinguishing and unifying consciousness cannot be ours, whose origin is an event in some particular time and is sought to be explained. There is consequently no other alternative for us than to admit the existence of a higher unity of intelligence, which is not in time but makes time, which is not in change but makes change possible, which gives reality to the changing phenomena of the universe and preserves the identity of self through all changes. In so far as we are conscious that the beginning of our existence is an event, we transcend ourselves and make this judgment from the stand-point of the ultimate unity of mind which is the centre and truth of the universe. The mind which is the pre-supposition and truth of both the inner and the outer world is not any individual but a universal

mind. This mind is God, whom we worship and pay homage to. We thus see that without God this vast universe is quite inexplicable and meaningless. Nature is not dead, as ordinary understanding supposes, but is a living reality. It is a wonderful book on every page of which words of wisdom are written, which surpass our understanding. The ordinary dualism of nature and nature's God is altogether erroneous. The true believer sees nothing but God in this wide world. Above there is nothing higher than He, below there is nothing deeper than He. Truly does the Psalmist exclaim : "Thou hast beset me behind and before, and laid thine hand upon me.....whither shall I go from thy spirit or whither shall I flee from thy presence."

What, then, it will now be naturally asked, are the finite minds? Now, a little reflection is sufficient to show that our own selves are unifying principles akin to the All-uniting Manifold-making Intellect presupposed in the existence of the universe. In so far as we are capable of knowledge we are the agencies that relate facts and combine them into the "cosmos of experience." That being so, we must *in toto* reject the theory that regards our finite souls as *created*. The only alternative, therefore, that we have, is to regard our finite consciousness as — I quote Green—"a certain reproduction of itself,

on the part of the eternal mind as the self of man—a reproduction of itself to which it makes the processes of animal life organic, and which is qualified and limited by the nature of these processes, but which is so far essentially a reproduction of the one supreme subject, implied in the existence of the world, that the product carries with it under all its limitations and qualifications the characteristic of being an object of itself.” This is the theory to which we are inevitably driven. There is a sense in which our consciousness can rightly be regarded as the supreme subject for which the universe exists. In essence, it is identical with the Divine consciousness. The difference lies only in its being a *partial* reproduction of the supreme consciousness under certain conditions. Verily the “I” of which we are conscious is the Divine Being Himself. God is we, we are God. The Father is identical with the Son, the Son is identical with the Father. The progressive manifestation of the eternally complete consciousness in us, no doubt belongs to time, but *self-consciousness* itself, as making time, is not in time.

If it is asked, why the eternal consciousness should reproduce itself as the self of man, the answer must be, there is no answer. We can no more say why the eternal consciousness should

thus reproduce itself than we can conceive of the manner in which it does so. We can only show by means of analysis that our finite selves become inexplicable unless we regard them as partial reproductions of the eternal mind. If we were merely finite, we could not possibly *know* ourselves as finite. The very fact that we know ourselves as finite and distinguish ourselves from other finite things and beings proves that there is an element of infinitude in us. If we were *mere* individuals, how could we know the existence of other individuals? To know the existence of other selves besides myself, I must transcend myself. It is not I, but the infinite in me, that knows myself and other selves, and distinguishes the former from the latter. If I were a mere individual, I could not know myself as such, nor be aware of the existence of other individuals. An analysis of the facts with which we are acquainted necessarily leads us to the conclusion that our finite selves are partial reproductions of the infinite mind, although it is impossible for us to know the manner in which such reproductions take place and the necessity of them. There are certain ultimate facts of which no explanation is possible. We can, for example, explain an object of experience by tracing the various relations in which it stands to other objects

of experience, but no such explanation of the "one all-inclusive system of relations" is possible. We cannot say why God exists, any more than we can say why the universe exists. There is no answer to the question, why. We can only exhibit by means of analysis the necessary inter-relation of the parts of the cosmic whole, but we cannot account for the cosmic whole itself. We can only show that mind and matter are the correlated aspects of the concrete whole, but we cannot say why there should be such a correlation. The business of philosophy is simply to *understand* what *is*. The nature of the finite mind being what it is, we can show that it must be the partial reproduction of an infinite and eternal mind. As to the how and why of such a reproduction, we must remain silent.

If there is truth in the theory that has been unfolded in the preceding pages, the materialistic doctrine falls to the ground. To say that mind is the product of matter, is only to say that mind is the product of itself; for, matter itself is spiritual. I may here take the opportunity of saying that the quarrel of the idealist is not with the materialist, in so far as he tries to find out the physical concomitants of mental phenomena. In this, the Idealist has the fullest sympathy with him. His conten-

tion simply is that the unity of self-consciousness for which all reality is, cannot be regarded as the product of anything. It is eternal, as is the material world which is its correlative. To trace the physical concomitants of mental phenomena is to trace the various relations in which the parts of the animal organism stand to each other and the relations in which the animal organism itself stands to its environment. But the existence of such relations presupposes a relating and unifying mind for which such relations are.

I have done with the constructive part of my argument. I shall now conclude by briefly examining some of the objections that are generally urged against the theory that has been propounded.

The charge of pantheism is often brought against an idealism like the one defended in this essay. Pantheism is a general term, which signifies great many theories often discordant with each other. If by pantheism is meant the doctrine which denies the absolute separation of God from the world, the doctrine which views the universe as the living thought of God, then the idealist unhesitatingly pleads guilty to the charge. If pantheism means the theory which denies the free will of man and the moral order of the universe, if it teaches that there is not even a relative distinction between

God and the universe, between the finite and the infinite, then he repudiates it. Absolute Idealism sees unity in diversity, freedom in necessity, spirituality in materiality and Divinity in humanity, and if for this the brand of pantheism be put upon it, it has no other option than to silently submit to the inevitable.

To many, pantheism is synonymous with atheism and irreligion. They see no truth in it and consider it dangerous to the interests of morality. In spite of the outcry raised against pantheism, it has at all times been advocated by many eminent thinkers. Pantheistic ideas pervade the writings of Carlyle and Emerson, by which a large section of the educated community is influenced. Many German thinkers are pantheistic in their tendency and their teachings influence a considerable number of men in all parts of the civilised world. As for India, it may be said to be the home of pantheism. It saturates the literature of ancient India and is deeply ingrained in the constitution of the Indian mind. A system which has always received the assent of not an inconsiderable section of thoughtful men can by no means be summarily disposed of as false and dangerous. It behoves us to discover its source of strength.

The great truth of pantheism is its conception

of the unity and spirituality of the universe and its fundamental error lies in its conception of this unity as a barren identity. So far as pantheism rejects deism and dualism, it is true. It conclusively proves that no *Deus ex machina* can account for the universe and that only a spiritual principle of unity can satisfactorily explain it. The hard and fast distinction between God and the universe, cause and effect, creator and creation, mind and matter, freedom and necessity disappears before its speculative vision. But pantheism errs when the monistic conception of the universe is carried to the extreme. A unity which has no element of difference in it, a universal which does not realise itself in particulars, an infinite which does not manifest itself in the finite, is a fictitious abstraction. In ignoring the finite and the changeable, pantheism unconsciously falls into the errors of dualism. Various expedients are resorted to, to avoid this, but in vain. If you altogether eliminate the many, the finite and the changeable from the eternal and unchangeable one, you create a gulf between them which you must somehow or other bridge over, if you are anxious to avoid the fatal mistake of dualism. But no sort of reconciliation is possible when the problem is stated in a faulty manner. If a unity without difference, a universal without particulars, an infinite

without the finite be regarded as a possible something, no feat of ingenuity can reconcile it with the phenomenal world without having recourse to the illogical method of dualism. The ancient philosophers of India sought to avoid the difficulty by denying the reality of the phenomenal world. They regarded it as *Maya* or illusion. But this is simply changing the name of the phenomenal world without in any way solving the problem. There the phenomenal world confronts you, be it a reality or an illusion and you *must* reconcile it with your One Immutable Being. Even an illusion is a reality and it must be accounted for. Whence comes the *Maya* and how can it exist side by side with the One, which alone is considered to be real. The difficulty cannot be got over so long as the spiritual principle of unity implied in the existence of the world is regarded as a barren identity.

The solution of the difficulty lies in the conception of the One as a *concrete universal*. It is a universal which exists by realising itself in the particular, an infinite which reveals itself in, comprehends and transcends the finite and an identity which differentiates itself into the many without losing its unity. The God of true monism does not dwell somewhere behind the universe and mould it from outside, but reveals himself in the entire

wealth of it. The universe is not composed of what is called dead matter, but is the thought of the Divine Being. In other words, it is the manifestation of God. Pantheism regards God as an Immutable Being in whom there is no element of difference. "But," as Hegel says, "if God be the abstract supersensible essence or being which is void of all difference and all specific character, he is only a bare name, and a mere *caput mortuum* of the abstract understanding." True philosophy does not in accepting monism ignore the phenomenal world, but seeks to explain it.

The conception of God as a barren identity, and the consequent reduction of the phenomenal world to a mere shadow, vitiates the ethics of pantheism. It makes the freedom of the will impossible. To regard God as a unity that is void of difference is to view him as substance and the phenomenal world and all finite beings as accidents. Finite beings having no substantiality of their own, must be regarded as solely determined by the one substance, God. It is impossible to bring God and the universe under a higher category than that of substance and accident so long as the virtual dualism of pantheism, resulting from its conception of God as a barren identity, is not abandoned. But when God is conceived of as a spiritual prin-

ciple of unity *realising* himself in the maniness of the phenomenal world, the difficulty is removed. Finite beings can no longer be regarded as accidents of the One substance. They appear in their true character as partial manifestations of the All-uniting Manifold-making Reason that constitutes the universe. Partaking, therefore, of the Divine nature they are free. The following remarks which Hegel makes in criticising Spinoza's pantheism may with advantage be quoted here: "In the system of Spinoza the freedom of the will has no place, and it has been rightly observed that every man who believes that human actions are indeed free, is by that belief alone elevated above Spinoza. It is true that this philosopher speaks of the freedom of the will, but he weakens and destroys the notion by subordinating it to that of substance," which in his view is the highest notion of all. Hence it follows that liberty in his system does not occupy that large place which it has a right to claim. Allowing to the words their natural sense it is evident that the proposition 'God is substance' almost entirely excludes the possibility of free will, whilst, on the contrary, freewill retains all its prerogatives if we define God by saying that He is the idea or notion of all things." By the idea or notion of all things, Hegel means the spiritual principle of unity which

becomes concrete by realising itself in the many and finite.

A true philosophy, it will thus be seen, must to a great extent be pantheistic. The universe can satisfactorily be explained from the stand-point of monism alone. Dualism has ever been and must always be self-contradictory. Its method is quite incompetent to grapple with the higher problems of philosophy. But at the same time, all true philosophy must avoid the fatal mistake which pantheism commits by regarding the spiritual principle of unity underlying the universe as a barren identity.

The second objection raised against idealism is that it regards the universe as a system of relations and consequently reduces it to an empty shadow. The universe does not consist of relations alone but of facts also. There must be facts to be related before any relation can exist between them. This objection, however, is based on misapprehension. What is called a fact or a definite reality is nothing more than a 'congeries of relations.' Take the table before me as an example. What is it but the synthesis of various relations? Can any body find in it anything more than quality, quantity, substantiality, individuality &c and are not all these terms *in* relations? The truth is that facts are cons-

tituted by relations, without which no fact or reality could exist for us.

The next important objection is urged from the point of view of natural and physical science. It is possible, says the naturalist, to reduce inorganic objects to ideas of the mind but organic objects have an individuality of their own. The position of a tree, for example, is not the same as that of a stone. Trees are organisms, although imperfect, and cannot be brought down to the level of inorganic objects. They have a sort of potential individuality of their own. Mind has been evolved out of matter, argues the evolutionist, and is consequently quite a recent product. To make it the centre and presupposition of the universe is to ignore the teachings of science. I would not have noticed these extremely childish objections had they not been brought forward by eminent authorities. The Absolute Idealist does not reduce external objects, be they organic or inorganic, to ideas of the mind. Such an objection may with relevancy be urged against the doctrine of a Hume or a Mill, but it does not affect the position of the Absolute Idealist. What he says is, that realities are constituted by relations and relations imply a relating mind. The vegetables may have a potential individuality, but their very existence

depends upon an eternal, all-unifying mind. If we carefully consider self-conscious organisms, we shall be able to realise this truth with greater clearness. The coming into existence of a human being and the gradual development of his consciousness imply a mind other than his. The conditions of his birth and the relations implied therein, presuppose a relating mind which cannot be his, inasmuch as it must be eternal, and the fact of his birth and growth *in time* implies a mind which is beyond time and makes possible the changes involved in birth and growth. As for the objection of the evolutionist, the answer is that the mind implied in the existence of the universe is not any finite mind, as has already been shown before. The inorganic matter which has evolved into consciousness in the course of innumerable years is real only as related to the universal mind. The theory of evolution, therefore, does in no way effect Absolute Idealism.

Another charge laid at the door of the idealistic view of the universe is that it is extravagant, dreamy and transcendental. Practical men, it is threatened, will have nothing to do with such a mystic bosh and will only consent to deal with positive facts. But if by positivism is meant adherence to facts as known in experience, the Ab-

solute Idealist is the positivist of positivists. He does not want anybody to attempt the extravagant task of going beyond knowledge and experience. He takes his stand upon positive and verified facts, steadily refuses to believe in any thing but what is known in experience and sets his face positively against mysticism. But, at the same time, he challenges the right of easy-going psychologists to talk glibly about matter and mind without making any critical inquiry into their nature and meaning. What Absolute Idealism says is this,—“Do not indulge in mysticism and transcendentalism. Adhere to positive facts alone. Carefully inquire into the import and meaning of the external and the internal world. The external world is a mass of dead matter to your unreflecting mind. Look at it with penetrating and searching eyes and you will find that it is not composed of inert lifeless matter but is the living thought of a living God. The whole scene will be transformed in a moment. Where you found death before, you will now find life; where you found bitterness and sorrow, you will now find peace, tranquility and serenity.

THE
RATIONAL BASIS
OF
MORALITY.

The conclusions at which we arrived in the preceding essay may be briefly summarised in the following words in which Green expresses the substance of Hegel's teachings: "There is one spiritual self-conscious being of which all that is real is the activity or expression; we are related to this being not merely as parts of the world which is its expression, but as partakers, in some inchoate measure of the self-consciousness through which this spiritual being at once constitutes and distinguishes itself from the world and this participation is the source of morality and religion. The whole world of human experience is the self-communication or revelation of this spiritual, eternal and absolute Being, and dependence upon and identity with such a Being constitutes at once the infinite littleness and the infinite greatness of man."

We have seen that the human soul is a partial reproduction of the infinite mind. In essence, it is identical with the supreme consciousness. Man is more than an animal. There is an element of infinitude in him. He is not subject to passing feelings merely, but is capable of transcending his lower self, of living a higher life. As a part of nature, man is no doubt an animal, but as a participant in the Divine consciousness, he is something more. It is because man is not only particular but also universal, not only limited by space and time but also beyond them, that morality and religion are possible for him. For, morality is the impulse to transcend our animal nature, to *be* actually what we feel we *are* potentially; and religion is the consciousness of our affinity to God, in so far as we are universal and free from the limitations imposed on us by our animal nature. The presence of an element of infinitude in finitude, of universality in particularity makes human nature a contradiction. The struggle to overcome this contradiction, or what is the same thing, the constant endeavour after the realisation of our higher self is the root-principle of morality.

We may, therefore, lay down *self-realisation* as the moral end. The self that has to be realised is the Divine self, whose communication of itself to man gives rise to the idea of an absolute *should be*

in his mind. Here, then, arises the distinction between what *is* and what *should be* without which morality would be impossible. The infinite spirit, as incarnate in man, finds itself limited, by certain conditions. There takes place, consequently, a return movement, whereby the finite spirit seeks to regain perfection, which now becomes its ideal. The very essence, therefore, of moral duty is, as Green says, to be imposed by a man upon himself. Man, as infinite, lays upon himself, as finite, the injunction to realise his eternal perfection. The impulse to realise this eternal perfection takes two forms. In the first place, it is to grasp the universe intellectually because, it is constituted by Reason with which man's self is identical, and secondly, the impulse is to appropriate it. Self-consciousness is the constitutive principle of the universe, but, as in man, it is limited by time, space and the conditions of an animal organism. The world depends upon and exists for thought, but to man it comes as an alien and even an enemy. The human mind is ignorant of that which is *its own*; it is limited and circumscribed by that over which it has a right to dominate. In man, the highest principle is the same self which makes the existence of the world possible, but it is *not realised*. There is, therefore, an innate tendency in him to realise his higher self, to *become* actually

what in possibility he *is*. What from one point of view is a reality eternally complete is, from another point of view, a *should be* which is never realised. The ground of morality, of a desire to pursue an ideal of perfection, lies, therefore, in the very constitution of the human mind. We may not be *conscious* of the fact that our finite consciousness is a partial reproduction of the Divine consciousness, but our ignorance does not quench the thirst of the mind to gain perfection—to recover its lost self, as it were. Self-realisation is not optional with us. We feel an *obligation* to know the world as it really is, to appropriate its contents or, in other words, to put our will into it. Moral progress means progress in self-realisation. It is synonymous with the growth and development of our intelligence and activity; or, to express the same fact in another way, with the gradual realisation in us of a perfect intelligence and will. Hence, it follows that there can be no such thing as passive morality. To talk of passive morality is as absurd as to talk of wooden iron. Morality is essentially active, because it consists in self-realisation. Where there is no struggle for self-realisation there is no morality. Progress in moral life, therefore, is to be measured not by the number of pious intentions which flit across the mind but by the extent to which the soul has grown in in-

telligence and will. The moral ideal is the eternally complete consciousness presupposed in the existence of the universe, and the realisation of this perfect intelligence and will in our life is the moral end.

Now, the human soul asserts its superiority over the world, its intrinsic right to dominate it, by a series of actions. It seeks to appropriate the world, to make it acknowledge its sovereignty. Human actions are not the mere development of spontaneous and purposeless movements, but the necessary means through which the finite spirit realises its higher life. The finite mind confronts the world without being daunted by its immensity, and seeks to master it, because it is one with the soul of the universe. There is an insatiable thirst for knowledge in every human mind—a thirst to which science and philosophy owe their origin—because the universe is constituted by thought or intelligence from which the finite intelligence of man is derived. You will not find a single man in the whole world, who does not seek to widen his life by putting his will into the objects around him, or, in other words, by appropriating them. There is not a man alive who does not seek to know more of the world. The lowest form of this desire to know is curiosity. The acquisition of knowledge is not the acquirement of mate-

rials foreign to us. "The growth of the knowledge of objects," as Professor Caird says, "is not a process in which the mind can be said to go *out of* itself as distinct from the process whereby it goes *into* itself or comes to itself. All ignorance of the object is ignorance of the self, all development of consciousness is also a development of self-consciousness." Similarly, the expansion of the sphere of a man's activity means a fuller realisation of himself. Man's self-consciousness is a narrower circle within the wider circle of the Divine consciousness. The development of his intelligence and will is, therefore, a gradual approximation to a perfect intelligence and will.

I have said that the finite self realises itself through a series of actions. Now, these actions are not isolated and independent of each other. They are related to each other as means to an end, in virtue of their being the actions of a common self. Just as self-consciousness combines objects into the systematic whole of the world, so does it reduce isolated actions to a system of actions. The present action of a human being is an end to which his previous actions have been the means, and the present action becomes, in its turn, the means to a future action. I read a treatise on metaphysics, for example. Now, the reading of this treatise is

an end to which the education received previously by me serves as means. But the reading of the treatise is itself a means to a further end, namely the acquirement of metaphysical knowledge and the formation of my own opinions regarding the questions with which this science deals. Isolated actions can be brought into relation to each other because they belong to a *self-conscious* and not a merely sentient being that can distinguish itself from its actions. The magic touch of self-consciousness, as it were, converts feelings into felt things. So relation to a self that is conscious of itself, transforms what would otherwise be but animal impulses and instinctive movements into the rational motives and intelligent actions of a "self-conditioning and self-distinguishing" being. The actions that are not referred to a common and abiding self are as unintelligible as those of a mad man. In fact, a man becomes insane when he ceases to become conscious of a permanent self and consequently when his actions lose their connection with each other. We saw before that apart from relation to the unity of the self, the world would lose *its* unity and fall asunder into unrelated particulars. We now see that the same self which relates objects to each other and combines them into the unity of the world also makes human ac-

tions intelligible and parts of a comprehensive plan.

Self-realisation, or, the progressive realisation in us of the absolute self of the universe, is the moral end. But the question now arises, has man the power of freely initiating actions? We have found that self-realisation is possible only through a series of actions related to each other as means to an end. But no intelligent action can be performed unless the will is free. Is the will free, then? This question really amounts to asking, is there anything external to the will? If it be found that the will stands in the same relation to the motive as an object in space does to another, then there can be no doubt that the necessitarian doctrine is true. Given the motive as something external to the will and it is settled that it fatally determines the will. In order to arrive at a right solution of the question, whether the will is free or no, it is necessary first to inquire what is the will and what is its relation to motives.

The will is nothing but self-consciousness considered as practical. No division is allowable between the self and the will. There is no such thing as an entity called the self having a special faculty called the will. The will is not something belonging to the self-conscious man but *is* the self-con-

scious man himself. The difference between intelligence and will is one of aspects only. It is the whole man that is cognitive theoretically and willing practically. In the concrete unity of self-consciousness, knowledge and action meet. In cognition as well as in volition, there is the whole man. It is an error, the source of which is abstract thinking, to suppose that one half of a man is in cognition and another half in volition.

The truth of the statement just made will be evident if we consider the relation between the three aspects of mind, knowing, feeling and willing. Knowing is an essentially active state of the mind. In feeling a sensation, the mind is commonly supposed to be passive, but even then there is implied an element of activity. A sensation, in order to be known, must be assimilated with like sensations and discriminated from unlike ones. But assimilation and discrimination are active operations of the mind. No line of demarcation, therefore, can be drawn between knowing and willing. There is, no doubt, much difference between *bodily* activity and *mental* activity, but so far as the essential characteristics of the active state are concerned, the one is alike the other. An element of feeling is also involved in knowing, in the shape of *interest* to know a thing and intellectual satisfaction when the desire

to know is satisfied. Feeling, again, is related to intellect on the one hand and to will on the other. There can be no action without a motive and motive is always some feeling. When we succeed in performing an action, we feel pleasure and when we fail, we are pained. Both pleasure and pain are feelings. A feeling, being a conscious state of the mind, is related to intellect. Mental phenomena, whatever else they may be, are conscious states of the mind. A feeling, therefore, of which there is no consciousness is an impossibility. Complex feelings or emotions must necessarily be associated with perceptions and representative images and consequently involve intellect. Will presupposes knowing and feeling. Some feeling must supply the incentive or motive to willing. Where there is no motive, there is no willing. Nor can there be an operation of the will if nothing has been previously willed. In other words, all willing implies that certain definite things, of which the mind is conscious, have been willed. We thus see that feeling and willing are inseparably related to each other and to intelligence that comprehends and overreaches them.

Will being inseparable from the willing man, to ask, is there anything external to the will is the same thing as to ask whether anything lies outside

of consciousness. To talk of an outside the self is, however, to indulge in language. For, it is the unity of self that makes the existence of an object determining its place in the intelligible world. An object exists in virtue of the relations it stands to other objects and to the world. Without the relations and the orderly world, the object would be reduced to a meaningless chaos. Objects are not objects of knowledge at all, but are known in their relations to each other that constitute the felt things. Successive feelings in experience are objects of experience must be distinguished from each other and constitute the unity of experience. A fact has existence in so far as it points to something beyond itself. A fact is distinguished. In other words, a fact is that "which is both itself and not itself." At the same time, a unity in difference constitutes the unity." In speaking of a thing as distinguished, it is necessary to distinguish it from the world, in order to assign a definite date to a fact, it is necessary to distinguish it from other facts existing at different moments of time. All facts existing in time and space have their existence fixed in virtue of their relations to other facts. In and through their mutual relations.

tionships is their definite being possible. But if the experienced world is a congeries of parts related to each other in endless ways, it implies a unifying principle which cannot be any of the objects of experience made possible *through* the synthesis. If objects exist in time and space in virtue of their mutual distinction, each of them must be present to a principle that unifies them, apart from which unification their very distinction from each other would be impossible. Differentiation and integration must go hand in hand. If the manifold objects of experience are related to each other, if each definite reality has its place in time and space fixed by the exclusion of other definite realities, then there is implied a principle of unity over-reaching the manifold. Such a principle is the unity of self-consciousness. It is only because there is the unity of the self in the background that external objects are distinguished from each other and combined into the totality of space. *Mere* difference is as meaningless as a self-contained unity. The very essence of reality is identity *in* difference and difference *in* identity. It is the unity of self-consciousness that is the fundamental element of identity in experience and that makes the synthesis of the manifold possible. It is a principle that relates the objects of experience to each other by being

of consciousness. To talk of an object being outside the self is, however, to indulge in meaningless language. For, it is the unity of self-consciousness that makes the existence of an object possible by determining its place in the intelligible world. An object exists in virtue of the relations in which it stands to other objects and to the self. Withdraw the relations and the orderly world would at once be reduced to a meaningless chaos. Mere feelings are not objects of knowledge at all. It is through their relations to each other that feelings become felt things. Successive feelings in order to become objects of experience must be held together, distinguished from each other and combined into the unity of experience. A fact has existence because it points to something beyond itself from which it is distinguished. In other words, a real something is that "which is both itself and not itself at one and the same time, a unity in difference or differentiated unity." In speaking of a thing as 'this thing,' it is necessary to distinguish it from that 'not-this'; in order to assign a definite date to an event, it is necessary to distinguish it from other events occurring at different moments of time. All objects existing in time and space have their positions in them fixed in virtue of their relations to each other. In and through their mutual relationship or rela-

tionships is their definite being possible. But if the experienced world is a congeries of parts related to each other in endless ways, it implies a unifying principle which cannot be any of the objects of experience made possible *through* the synthesis. If objects exist in time and space in virtue of their mutual distinction, each of them must be present to a principle that unifies them, apart from which unification their very distinction from each other would be impossible. Differentiation and integration must go hand in hand. If the manifold objects of experience are related to each other, if each definite reality has its place in time and space fixed by the exclusion of other definite realities, then there is implied a principle of unity over-reaching the manifold. Such a principle is the unity of self-consciousness. It is only because there is the unity of the self in the background that external objects are distinguished from each other and combined into the totality of space. *Mere* difference is as meaningless as a self-contained unity. The very essence of reality is identity *in* difference and difference *in* identity. It is the unity of self-consciousness that is the fundamental element of identity in experience and that makes the synthesis of the manifold possible. It is a principle that relates the objects of experience to each other by being

present to and distinguishing itself from each one of them. Being that which makes time and space possible, it cannot itself be anything existing in them. Being that which gives reality* to the objects of experience by relating them to each other, it cannot itself be an object of experience.^f It is through relation to the unity of self-consciousness that the experienced world exists and the unity of self-consciousness, whose very essence is synthetic activity, exists, because the experienced world has existence, which is due to its unifying operations. Apart from the external world, the unity of self-consciousness would not exist, because there would be no occasion for the exercise of its synthetic activity which is its essence, and apart from the unity of self-consciousness, the existence of the external world would not be possible, because there would be nothing to combine the chaotic manifold of sense into a systematic and inter-related whole.

If there is truth in what has been said above, if the world of knowledge is "a system in which every element, being correlative to the other at once presupposes and is presupposed by every other" implying "a unity which distinguishes itself from and finds itself in not this or that thing but everything, if fact or matter of experience consists in relationship and as such presupposes self-conscious-

ness, the only thing that we know in which a manifold is united without ceasing to be manifold" then there can be nothing outside of the self and therefore of the will, which, as I have said, is practical self-consciousness. There being nothing external to the self-conscious will, it cannot be determined by anything that is foreign to itself. The objects by which a self-conscious man is determined to act are *his* objects, which owe their objectivity to *his* synthetic activity and in being determined by them he is determined by himself. The very question, is the will free, is meaningless. It assumes as if there could be anything outside of the will. But "self-consciousness and its objects, will and its objects form a single individual unity". As self-consciousness is the central principle of the experienced world which is a systematic whole of inter-related parts, nothing can be beyond it and, therefore, beyond the will. The supposition, therefore, that the will may be determined by something alien to it is altogether chimerical. "There is no agency beyond the will determining what the will shall be; not in the man for the will *is* the self-conscious man not elsewhere than in the man, not outside him, for the self-conscious man has no outside."

Is the proposition, the will has no agency beyond it determining what it shall be, identical with the

proposition, the will acts without any motive? The answer is, no. An action without a motive? is an inconceivable absurdity. If by free will any body understands the power of acting without any motive, then he is utterly mistaken. Unless some thing has been previously willed, there can be no operation of the will at all. Action presupposes the identification of self with some object of desire, which is a motive. But "a motive is not something independent of a man, which acts upon him from without." It is an idea of the self-satisfaction of the man himself. "It is the conception of himself as capable of something other than that which at the moment he is". To admit the determination of the will by motives, is therefore, not to deny free will. A motive is always an idea of self realisation which a man forms for himself and the self-conscious will in being determined by it really determines itself by itself. The object willed is not something external to the will; it is the will itself in a different aspect. The will does not stand in the same relation to the motive as a ball does to another impinging it from without. The freedom of an agent does not consist in being *not* determined but in being *self*-determined. Now "that which determines the self to act is a motive, and a motive is some idea of itself as a subject to be satisfied, or

that the action of a motive upon the self is really a form of that inter-action of self and not self which constitutes self-consciousness." The unity of self-consciousness, over-reaches the distinction between self and not-self, the will and its motive, namely the object willed. All its determinations, therefore, are in the last resort self-determination. The self cannot be determined by anything that is not *within* it, for, anything external to it does not exist.

But, the necessitarian will argue, we can foretell what the conduct of a man in a particular case will be, if we know his character. As is the character of a man, so are his actions. Place a cup of wine before a drunkard, and it is sure that he will drink it. A habitual thief cannot resist the temptation of stealing a few pieces of gold, if he finds an opportunity for it. We safely entrust a man, whom we know to be honest, with a responsible duty. Now does not all this go against the doctrine of free will? If the will is free, how is it possible to tell what in a particular instance it will be? To predict the actions of a man is to deny his power of freely initiating them. One who is really free is expected to act in an arbitrary manner, that is in one way at one time and just in the opposite way at another time. If he does not so act, he, at least, *may* do so and consequently it is not possible to foretell what

his action, in a given circumstance, will be. Our predictions *may* be verified, but there is no ground for saying that they *will* be verified. In short, the necessitarian is apt to argue, that to maintain that in a developed character action is the result of habit is to deny the self-determining power of man. If you hold by free will, you must declare human actions to be the results of arbitrary freaks of fancy. If a man is more than the series of his feelings and actions, he has it in his power to be other at the next moment than what he is at the present moment. This objection, however, arises from a misunderstanding. It is a mistake to suppose that the habit of a man is something other than what he forms for himself, "that it is an alien force moving him in a direction in which he cannot help being carried." A habit, to quote Green's language, "is only formed through a man's conscious presentation to himself of objects as his good, as that in which his self-satisfaction is to be found. Just so far as an action is determined by habit, it is determined by an object which the agent has made his own and has come to make his own in consequence of actions similarly determined. He is thus conscious of being the author of the act; he imputes it to himself." What we are and shall be depends, in a great measure, upon what we *freely* have been.

If you sow the wind, you shall have to reap the whirlwind. If you indulge in vicious thoughts and actions, your character will acquire an evil bias. The actions of a man are, no doubt, governed by his habit, but the habit is not anything external to the man. It is what *he* has made it. To say, therefore, that habit governs the actions of a man, is simply to say that a man seeks self-satisfaction in the way in which he is accustomed to seek it. That is to say his notion of a present good depends upon what his idea of good has generally been in the past.

It is the dependence of the present conduct of an individual on his past that makes a steady progress in moral life possible. "The dependence," I quote Green once more, "of the individual's present on his past so far from being incompatible with his seeking or being able to become better than he is, is just what constitutes the definite possibility of this self-improvement being sought and attained. If there were no such dependence, If I could be something today irrespectively of what I was yesterday, or something to-morrow irrespectively of what I am today, the motive to the self-reforming effort furnished by regrets for a past, of which I reap the fruit, that growing success of the effort that comes with habituation, and the assurance of a

better future which animates it would alike be impossible." Habit, it will thus be seen, is an essential element in the formation of character. Our success or failure in making ourselves better, in living a consistent and pious life in the midst of the trials and temptations of the world, depends, to a large extent, upon the sort of habit that we have formed. It is very important, therefore, to exercise constant control over our thoughts and actions. Every action of ours, however unimportant it may be in itself, tends to give a particular direction to our character. The effects of our actions accumulate until "the life becomes crystalised in habit". If our thoughts and actions have been good, the general tenor of our life will be good; if they have been bad the whole tendency of life will be bad. It is not in the power of any man to easily resist the force of habit.

Our brief discussion of the question of free will has shown us that man has the power of realising himself by freely initiating actions. In so far as we are untrue to the dictates of our higher self, we are selfish. To know nothing higher than the individual self, to voluntarily remain confined within the prison-house of our animal nature, is selfishness. Of course, man cannot wholly be an animal, cannot but to some extent strive to overcome the innate

contradiction of his nature. Consequently, absolute selfishness is an impossibility. However much we may choose to remain a mere animal, to whatever extent we may have become the slaves of passing interests and animal pleasures, still we are more than a part of nature, more than merely finite. The struggle to overcome the contradiction of our nature always abides, however weak it may be. In so far as man regards pleasure, the satisfaction of animal desires as the *summum bonum*, he stifles his universality, although he can never wholly destroy it.

But can the individual man realise himself? Is it possible for a finite spirit to so far approximate to the eternally perfect supreme spirit as to feel itself *realised*? Reason is universal and cannot find satisfaction in particular goods. The disparity between the universal and the particular never disappears from the moral life of man. Self-consciousness is that *for* which the universe exists and man as a self-conscious being is, in a sense, the creator of the universe. But in man, self-consciousness is limited by time and space. That which is the source of the universe, is, in man, limited by its own product. Man is the master of nature, but he is also her child. It is this contradiction that the moral life attempts to remove and so long as man lives by himself, it cannot be removed. Nothing

short of a thorough mastery of the universe can satisfy the self-realising impulse of man. The series of particular goods in which he seeks to realise himself fall far short of the ideal. This gives rise to spiritual discontent from which the ascetic notion of self-sacrifice arises. Asceticism seeks to eliminate desires from the rational nature of man. The total extinction of our animal nature, the suppression of all desires and the attainment of a pure universality is its ideal. This is, for instance, the Buddhistic notion of self-sacrifice. Asceticism cuts the Gordian knot which it cannot untie. To abstract reason from desire, the universal from the particular, is to reduce reason to a meaningless abstraction. To us, blank universality is something altogether inconceivable. We are men in so far as we are actuated by desires. The term desire need not be understood in a bad sense. Our aspirations to become better, to become more and more reconciled with God, to disinterestedly serve Humanity *are* desires. What it is to aspire to gain a higher life, without *desiring* to attain it, is more than what we can say. The extinction of desires is, therefore, something quite meaningless. Even our animal instincts are not meant to be suppressed. They exist for being *moralised* not *extinguished*.

The truth of asceticism is that it sees the impossibility of the rational nature of man being satisfied with the attainment of particular objects of desire: its error lies in the rigid distinction which it draws between reason and desire. Reason is not something wholly irreconcilable with desire. On the contrary, reason, in so far as it is practical, realises itself by means of desires, which it converts into its own ideas of self-satisfaction. Self-consciousness transmutes desires and makes them the means of its own expression. A self-conscious being is not determined by his desires in the same way as a ball is determined by another striking it. Even in treating of an organism, it is necessary to go beyond the categories of causality and reciprocity: much more must we do so in dealing with a self-conscious being and his actions. The desires of a man are not related to his actions as a cause is to its effect. If we wish to find out the *causes* of the bodily movements through which actions are performed, we must look for them in the antecedent series of muscular actions. Desires = the ideas of self-satisfaction which a man forms for himself and consequently partake of the nature of the self. They are as much above the series of physical events related to each other as cause and effect as the self. I take a book from the table

before me. Now, the cause of the removal of the book from the table is *not* my *desire* of removing it, but a certain degree of force applied to it with my hand in lifting it. The cause again of the particular movements of the hand made in applying the force to the book is to be found in the antecedent stretching of the muscles and so on. My *desire* to remove the book is the idea or conception of a particular manner in which I seek to realise myself and is consequently an expression of myself. The category of causality is as inapplicable to it as to my *self*.

We must, therefore, steer clear of the one-sided views that ignore the element of desire or the element of reason in our concrete practical life. "Will willing itself" is an impossible conception. No voluntary activity is possible unless it is preceded by some desire. To maintain that will can will itself is to fall into the worst errors of Libertarianism. As in the sphere of knowledge, self-consciousness is the combining principle of objects and their parts, apart from relation to which it would not exist, so in the sphere of action, it is the principle that rationalises desires, without which it could not act. If the will were to will itself, nothing particular could be willed, and not to will anything particular is not to will at all. Here, as elsewhere,

the universal and the particular, are inseparable from each other. Practical reason or will must, in willing, particularise itself or make some desire the object or motive of action. Reason cannot be abstracted from desires, simply because there can be no unmotivated action. As practical reason presupposes desires, which are its expression, so desires, at least those of a human being, imply self-consciousness. The supervention of self-consciousness converts natural inclinations into the rational motives of a free being. To ignore the element of reason in our active life is to conceive of motives and actions as related to each other as cause and effect which, as we have already seen, cannot be done. Only the successive states of a permanent object existing *in space* can be brought under the category of causality. Causality is an *objective* category and cannot, therefore, be applied to the phenomena of the inner life. A feeling organism, by the very fact of its sentiency, rises above the determinations of time and space. For, feeling is not in time and space at all, though the *duration* of a feeling does, no doubt, belong to time. Feeling is the first stage of self-consciousness and, as such, transcends time and space, like the latter. The unity of an organism virtually overcomes the mutual externality of its parts; but if it is sentient, it ceases to be a mere

part of nature. To regard a feeling as the cause of an action is to conceive of it and the action as the successive states of an object existing in space, which is absurd. Even the desires and actions of an animal, therefore, are not subject to the law of causality. *Its* desires too, like those of a man, are the expression of self-consciousness or reason; only in the animal, reason is not conscious of itself. Desire, we thus see, is inseparable from and is the manifestation of reason in its practical aspect. If reason cannot be abstracted from desire, no more can desire, even in an animal, be conceived of as existing independently of reason. The possibility of knowledge implies the going of self-consciousness out of itself to the multiplicity of objects and events held together in space and time and a return of it from them to itself. The possibility of action, similarly, depends upon the expression of reason in desires and the referring of them to the unity of the self. Without desires, reason cannot will; and without reason desires are, at best, blind impulses only and cannot, therefore, be the motives of rational willing.

Asceticism, we have seen, is a false remedy of the moral discontent that springs from the self finding itself *not* realised in particular goods. The cure of this spiritual unrest can be effected only

by the individual merging his life in the wider life of society. Moral life, which consists in self-realisation, *really* begins when the individual learns to regard himself as a member of the social organism. For, only in the social state is self-realisation possible for man. In so far as a man surrenders his isolated personality and regains his individuality *through* the wider life of society, he is a moral being. True self-sacrifice, then, is not the ascetic extinction of desires. It is to die to the lower self in order to gain the higher self. It is the *enlargement* of our individual self by participation in the life of society and Humanity. Such an identification with the life of society and Humanity is neither the annihilation of self nor the extinction of desires. The same desires that are immoral when employed to serve the finite ends of the individual become renewed, transformed and moralised when they are made to subserve the higher purposes of society. Ambition, for example, as the desire for self-aggrandisement is immoral. But ambition to make society better, to promote the higher interests of Humanity is an altogether new thing and a virtue. So again, anger is a vice when it is only a desire to injure somebody for some private grudge. But it assumes the form of what is called righteous indignation when it is

directed against the moral evils that retard the progress of mankind. It is needless to multiply instances. In true self-sacrifice, which, as I have said, consists in the identification of our individual interests with the interests of society and Humanity, desires are not extinguished but moralised. Similarly, our finite self is not thereby lost but widened. As members of the social organism, and in faithfully discharging the duties of our various stations, we, to a great extent, realise our higher nature. For a fuller realisation of our higher self, we must enter into the domain of religion. Religion comprehends within itself and transcends morality.

A question of considerable importance now arises, which must be satisfactorily answered. What is the relation of the individual to society? Is the latter something foreign to the former and are its laws and regulations only another name for the curtailment of individual liberty? Or, is the individual to absolutely sacrifice his liberty at the altar of the mighty social organisation? Is the individual nothing and society everything?

In oriental countries, personality is not recognised. The individual has absolutely no free choice in his actions. His life, even to the minutest detail, has to be regulated by certain codes and conven-

tions of society. The obligation to do a thing does not proceed from *within* but from *without*. It is not the inward voice of conscience, but the precepts laid down in the holy books that decide for him what is right and what is wrong. Laws embodied in the Scriptures or *Shastras* are obeyed, not because the individual freely approves of them, but because they are the injunctions of sages. The laws of Manu, for example, may be quite unsuited to the requirements of the present age, some of them may be unjustifiable and even immoral in their tendency, but the orthodox Hindu cannot but obey them. He is bound hand and foot. He has no private judgment, and must slavishly submit to the ordinations on which his society is based. Hegel is fully justified in saying : "Morality is in the East a subject of positive legislation and although the moral prescriptions (the *substance* of their Ethics) may be perfect, what should be internal subjective sentiment is made a matter of external arrangement. There is no want of a will to command moral actions, but of a will to perform them because commanded from *within*. Moral distinctions and requirements are expressed as laws, but so that the subjective will is governed by these laws as by an external force. Nothing subjective in the shape of disposition, conscience, formal freedom is recog-

nised." In short, in the East, the individual is the slave of society. It is considered enough, if human actions receive the sanction of established usages and customs. The question whether they are right or wrong from a *moral* point of view is not even raised.

But if the oriental notion of the relation between society and the individual is false, is the opposite view, namely that which advocates the unlimited assertion of individuality, justifiable? A little consideration will show that an uncompromising assertion of individual liberty is entirely subversive of social organisation. Allow the individuals to stand forward as self-subsistent egos, and society will soon be resolved into savage atoms. As slavish submission to social usages and customs destroys the manhood of man, so does an unlimited assertion of individuality strike at the roots of social organisation. To avoid the difficulty some maintain that our assertion of individuality should only not interfere with the rights of others. Within this limit, it is perfectly allowable to act according to subjective tastes and inclinations. This theory, however, completely ignores the fact that the social bond is not of such a negative nature. Men do not only restrict their individual liberty so as not to interfere with the rights of others, but sacrifice their

subjective interests to promote the well-being of society. In short, society is *not* an organisation formed by men for mutual protection, but is a field for the realisation of their higher life.

The truth is that society is an organism, the members of which are its self-conscious limbs. Society is composed of individuals; but it is not an outward collection of them. Individuals have their *substance* in society. As a limb, severed from the bodily organism resolves itself into inorganic atoms, so does a human being separated from society lose his manhood. Social laws and institutions do not limit individuality. On the contrary, they are the outward embodiment of man's moral nature. The true view is neither to regard the social organisation as an *external* power, before which individuals are helpless, nor to look upon it as an alien something that limits subjective freedom, but to regard it as a field for the realisation of true manhood. Society, instead of limiting our subjective freedom, gives free scope to it. The orientals err by regarding social laws and institutions as something alien to man, which leave no room for the exercise of his subjective freedom. But when a man *consciously and freely* identifies himself with society, when he realises that its ordinances are the outward embodiment of the moral

law *within*, he can no longer be called its slave. Man is by nature a social being. It is only in the savage state that he lives isolated. Even then he is not a mere individual. For, the family relationship makes him, to some extent, cast away the dross of his natural self. In truth a mere individual is an abstraction. Nothing lives alone in creation.

Individual liberty and rational obedience to society are not irreconcilable with each other. On the contrary, individual liberty is possible only in a social state. The opinion has been held by some thinkers that the existence of society implies restrictions upon the freedom of man and that he can be perfectly free only in a natural state. A little reflection, however, shows that in an unsocial state right must be synonymous with might. The existence of the rights of an individual depends upon their recognition by others, and such a recognition is possible only in a community of free men, that is, in society. No one could exercise the rights claimed by him if his fellows refused to recognise them. Men are free, and therefore are capable of rights, in so far as they have the conception of the common good, in consequence of which they agree to restrict each other's spheres of action. It is in virtue of such a restriction that rights come to exist. The reference to the common good

renders the restriction itself a feature of freedom, for, in the common good every one participates. Society, in its laws, reduces the various restrictions to which the conception of the common good leads the individual to submit, to a system. The existence of individual rights presupposes the existence of society. By obeying the laws of society, an individual only fulfils the condition of his exercising his freedom. "In analysing the nature of right," observes Green, "we may conveniently look at it on two sides and consider it as on the one hand a claim of the individual arising out of his rational nature, to the free exercise of some faculty ; on the other, as a concession of that claim by society, a power given by it to the individual of putting the claim in force. But we must be on our guard against supposing that these distinguishable sides have any really separate existence. It is only a man's consciousness of having an object in common with others, a well-being which is unconsciously his in being theirs and theirs in being his, only the fact that they are recognised by him and he by them as having this object, that gives him the claim described." Again : "The foundation of the right to free life is capacity on the part of the subject for membership of a society, for determination of the will, and through it of the

bodily organisation, by the conception of a well-being as common to self with others. This capacity is the foundation of the right potentially, which becomes actual through the recognition of the capacity by a society and through the power which the society in consequence secures to the individual of acting according to the capacity."

We thus see how strictly correlative the exercise of individual rights is to obedience to society, which means nothing more than obedience to the laws which make the exercise of rights possible. A one-sided assertion of individual rights is the result of that abstract thinking which supposes that rights are quite independent of the bindings which hold individuals together. It is seldom that we take a comprehensive view of things. Our difficulty about harmonising individual liberty with obedience to society arises from the hard and fast distinction which we draw between the inner spirit of the individual and the laws of society. The laws of society and the state are the creations of the human spirit for the realisation of its freedom. They are the outward embodiment of the moral law within. It is hence that the social customs and usages of a nation become more perfect along with the development of its moral ideal. If obedience to the moral law is not destructive of individual

liberty, no more so is obedience to the regulations of society which are but the moral law inside out and specified. Our moral duties are *social* in their nature. It is a mistake to isolate the individual from society. Man is man in virtue of the laws which bind him to his fellows, and to those laws which constitute the framework of society and make the existence of his rights possible, his obedience is due.

The social organism, then, is the concrete embodiment of man's higher self. In the customs and usages of society, the moral law has its contents. Man, as a moral being, cannot live independently of the social organism of which he is a member. "The individual", to use the language of Professor Caird, "is a law to himself just because he is conscious of himself as a member of a society whose law is *his* law; and if he draws into himself so as to lose consciousness of this relation, his inner life and its inner law are emptied of their meaning. Reason as the law of a merely individual or subjective life rules in an empty house." "We are moral subjects only as we are conscious of ourselves as members with others of one society and are able, therefore, to view ourselves, like them, impartially with reference to the ends of society. We cannot *but* measure ourselves by the standard of the society to which we belong." "Morality springs out of the

inevitable mediation of the consciousness of self by the consciousness of our relations to others and the consequent necessity of judging ourselves from a social point of view, whether it be the point of view of the family or of the nation or whatever be the society to which we thus relate ourselves." .

That the demands of morality coincide with the concrete purposes of society is a proposition, the truth of which will be evident to us, if we reflect upon the utter incompetency of what may be called "The Ethics of Inwardness" to account for the facts of moral life. The first objection that may be brought against an individualistic morality is that if every one is to act according to the light which he pretends to receive from his inner consciousness, who is to arbitrate between the deliverances of the consciences of different individuals? Can such an arbitration be possible at all when it is the infallible conscience that speaks? My conscience says one thing. Your conscience says something else. Whose conscience is to be held valid? If every one is to act according to his own light, how is the unity of society to be preserved? The individualist may say that the command of our higher self should be obeyed. But this answer does in no way remove the difficulty. How is the higher self to be determined and in what way is it to be distinguished from

the lower self? Perhaps, it will be said in reply, that such difficulties do not practically arise. The answer is that such difficulties do not arise because men's common sense often gets the better of their theories. Society manages to get on because in the majority of cases we look for guidance to our stations in society and their attendant duties and not to the inner consciousness. Quarrels, misunderstandings and collisions of consciences take place when instead of adopting this simple course we choose to look within in order to get at the higher self.

In the second place, the advocates of an individualistic morality have to show how it is possible to develop particular moral rules purely from within. Surely, it will not be maintained, in this last decade of the Nineteenth Century, that the soul is born with the decalogue engraved on its tablet. Besides, have particular moral rules any meaning without a reference to society? To an individual completely isolated from society—assuming for arguments sake the possibility of such an isolation—the moral rule 'Do not steal', for example, can have no meaning. Stealing presupposes property and property presupposes the social fabric. The moral law that prohibits false behaviour presupposes our solidarity with our fellows. The

particular moral rules are nothing but laws determining the relations of individuals to each other within the unity of the social organism. In this connection, there is yet another difficulty which we have to state. If the different rules of morality be not regarded as the particularisation of the moral law embodied in the social organism, and if each of them be regarded as absolute, how is it possible to reconcile their *plurality* with their absoluteness? *Ten* moral rules, *each* absolute, is not the very idea absurd?

In the third place, it should be observed that the very *fact* of men's entering into the social state puts an end to the possibility of the individual becoming a law and an end to himself. If each person were an end to himself, how could he be a member of society without contradicting his essential nature? To be a member of society is not only to be an end to one's own self, but also to be a means to the self-realisation of the others. One who is an end to himself cannot without contradicting himself be a means to others. If it be said in reply that it is a mistake to enter into the social state, the rejoinder is, what is to prevent the individuals from interfering with each others liberty in an unsocial state? Will not each individual, apart from the bindings of society, be a

standing menace to another ? Each individual, by being an end to himself, becomes *ipso facto* an absolute being. How can one absolute being suffer itself to be limited by another absolute being ? The truth is that the very fact of the existence of society and of the security of the individuals only in a social state proves the baselessness of the individualistic theory. As Professor Caird says, the existence of society as a compulsive power "implies that there is a positive relation of self-conscious beings to each other *prior* to the negative relation which they have as individual persons. But if this be admitted, the community of men with each other becomes the pre-condition of their relation to each other, and this means that in the individual person as such, the universal or rational life is not realised."

The abstract maxim of morality is "Do what is right", "Do what your conscience tells you to do." In Kant's language, it is as follows : "Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time wish that it (the maxim) became a universal law." "Act so as to treat Humanity, whether in your person or in that of any one else always as an end ; if as a means still at the same time as an end." "Act only in such a way as that the will can regard itself by its maxim as at the same time

giving universal law." Now, as abstract principles these maxims are unexceptionable. But their defect lies precisely in their being abstract. It is undoubtedly true that we should do what is right and act according to the dictates of conscience. But the question is, how am I to determine what is right for me in all the practical concerns of life? It is not enough to say "Do your duty." I must *find out* my duties. Ethical writers who lay down abstract principles of morality must point out the means of translating them into the practical spheres of life. "Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time wish that it became a universal law." But what is such a maxim and how to find it out? What is the guarantee that a certain principle of action which I wish to see universally adopted really deserves to be so universalised? "Act only in such a way as that the will can regard itself by its maxim as at the same time giving universal law." In what way? Is it not possible for each individual will to regard itself as giving universal law? If so, what becomes of the universality of the will? Each individual will laying down separate universal laws, thereby making more than one system of universal laws—is this not something absolutely self-contradictory? It may be said that the voice of con-

science will decide what is right. But is there no objective standard by which right and wrong can be judged and with which *real* dictates of conscience absolutely coincide? To deny the existence of such an objective standard is to lay the axe at the roots of conscience itself and to give free play to subjective whims and caprices passing for the deliverances of conscience.

In protesting against the "Ethics of Inwardness", I desire to guard against the danger of being misunderstood. If I hold that morality is utterly impossible to a rational being whose consciousness is not mediated by the consciousness of his relations to others, I am equally firm in repudiating that type of utilitarianism which seeks to account for our sense of moral obligation by resolving it into a fixed habit of obeying the external precepts of society and the state. I simply maintain that in the concrete moral life of man, legality cannot be separated from morality. The various relations between the individuals determined by society and the state are but the externalisation of the moral law within, and the moral law within is but the internalisation of the precepts of society and the state without. Here, as elsewhere, the inward and the outward are but the correlated aspects of the concrete whole. Isolate a man from

the society to which he belongs and you empty him of his essential meaning and reduce him to a mere slave of society and the state and you bring him down to the level of the brute. The society to which a man belongs is *his* society and the laws which regulate it are *his* laws. Conversely, the social organism becomes conscious of itself in him and his fellows.

It is in the social organism that the moral ideal is concretely embodied. My station in society reveals to me my particular duties. If I am to ascertain what is right for me, what I should do and what I should not do, I have only to look to my positions in the family, society and the state. Each station in these different spheres has its attendant duties. Given the station and the particular duties follow. "My station and its duties," this is the Alpha and Omega of morality. By placing the moral ideal in the concrete purposes of the social organism, we get rid of the defects of the theory of the abstract moralists. Instead of abstract principles, we have "my station and its duties." The voice of conscience coincides with my obligation to duly discharge the various duties which follow necessarily from my stations in the family, society and the state. When it does not so coincide, we should understand that it is not a voice

of conscience, but only a subjective caprice mistaken for the deliverance of conscience.

It will thus be seen that we are moral beings only as members of the social organism. Individuals have their concrete duties in virtue of their stations in society. What the body is to the soul, that the social organism is to morality. A purely individualistic ethics is impossible. To isolate an individual from the social organism is to eviscerate him of his moral worth. Comte's *dictum* "the individual as such is an abstraction" is true to the letter. Persons widely differing from him in their metaphysical views fully agree with him in holding this opinion. In the family, society and the state the moral ideal is concretely realised. It is a mistake to think that society is a collection of individuals. On the contrary, individuals derive their moral worth by participating in the wider life of society and the state. In the eloquent language of Dr. John Caird, we may say that "we do not get first the idea of man, and then add to it the further idea of society or the social union; for man is not man, the idea of human nature cannot be expressed apart from the social relation in which alone that nature is realised. The existence of a spirit in pure individuality apart from other spirits is not conceivable, for a spiritual being is one that

finds itself only in what is other than itself; it must lose its isolated individuality in order truly to find or be itself." Again, "In one sense the members of the social organism in which I live, the institutions, the civil and political organisation of the community to which I belong, are outside or independent of me and there are certain duties and obligations which they authoritatively impose on me. They constitute a moral order, an external or objective morality to which I must submit. But in another sense, they are not foreign to me, they are more truly me than my private self. Apart from them I have no real self, or only the false self of a fragment taking itself for a whole. It is when the moral life of society flows into me that my nature reaches a fuller development; and then only are my social duties adequately fulfilled when they cease to have the aspect of an outward law and pass in love and devotion, into the spontaneity of a second nature."

Moral life, it will thus be seen, consists in self-realisation through self-renunciation. Man's consciousness being derived from the supreme consciousness, there is an inborn tendency in him to realise his higher self, or, in other words, to gain perfection. But so long as he remains a mere individual, it is impossible for him to gain perfection.

Self-realisation through self-renunciation may seem a paradox, but if we remember that the self that has to be realised is the Divine self the paradoxical character of the proposition will disappear. The first awakening of self-consciousness in man creates the widest possible gulf between the infinite spirit and himself. As a self-conscious ego, he stands opposed to all other things and beings; though all is the expression of one life that pervades the universe. The cause of this discord is to be found in the fact that man is both finite and infinite. As a self-conscious being, he is infinite; for, reason or self-consciousness is the constitutive principle of the universe, but as connected with and conditioned by an animal organism, he is finite. In the latter character, he, being one among many individuals, finds himself thwarted and limited by other finite things and beings; but his rational nature enables him to look beyond his finitude and impels him to realise his higher life. He seeks, therefore, to master the contents of the universe and to lord it over it. But his finite life cannot take up into itself the contents of the infinite universe. *As an individual*, he cannot crush other individuals and bring them under his control. The truth is that man as an individual seeks to conquer the world because his finite nature usurps the privilege

which belongs only to his higher or rational nature. In this way the discord in his life, of which I have spoken, is only intensified. For, finitude can never triumph over finitude. We can escape from the difficulty only if we recognise that, in so far as we are individuals, we stand on an equal footing with other individuals, *i.e.* we are limited by as we limit others. Our real self—that self which no finite thing or being can limit—is the rational part of our nature, which is akin to and derived from the supreme reason presupposed in the existence of nature. I can regard myself as one among many individuals; that is, I know myself as I know others, but this is possible, because I have a higher self which comprehends within itself and transcends all finite selves including myself. Now, the social organism is the embodiment of this higher self and consequently in being one with it, I really become one with myself. Self-realisation, which, as we have seen, is the moral end becomes impossible and the contradiction of our nature is intensified if we seek to magnify our *finite* self. The discord of our moral life is healed only when we go beyond our finite selves and from the point of view of the higher self, of which the social union is the concrete realisation, regard ourselves as comprehended within and participants in it.

It may be objected against the doctrine formulated above that every human being is conscious of being a law and an end to himself. How can he, then, consistently with such a consciousness, regard himself as an instrument for carrying out the purposes of the social organism? Has not every man an inner life—a life with which no other person except himself has any concern—an encroachment upon which he strongly resents? If society is prior to the individual, what becomes of the right of private judgment, which is the boast of modern enlightenment? The answer is, that the very consciousness which a cultivated man has of being a law and an end to himself rests upon his being a participant in the life of society. The consciousness of law and order is developed in connection with society. An individual who has not been previously accustomed to regard the laws of society and the state as unconditionally binding upon him, cannot be conscious of an inner law to which his unflinching obedience is due. The consciousness of an inner law is possible to an individual only when he has attained a considerable degree of culture and refinement. An African savage or an American Indian is as innocent of the consciousness of such an inner law as the happy animals that roam about in the forest. The inner law is

the correlative of the outer law. The consciousness of it in the abstract form arises when the outer law ceases to adequately embody it, that is when an individual begins to feel that the laws of the society to which he belongs fall short of the higher ideal of moral life that has been developed in his mind. "If the moral law", as Professor Caird says, "can be conceived in its abstraction as a law resting on the consciousness of the individual of an inner life, in which he is alone with himself, yet this conception can only be the result of an *individualistic* return upon the self, which involves a reaction against social forms that have become insufficient and is a step in the transition towards the development of the higher social consciousness." The rise of an individualistic conception of morality, as that of Kant, is due to a reaction against social observances that have ceased to adequately reflect the moral law; but such a reactionary stage cannot be a permanent stage. Its value lies in its leading to a higher development of the social organism.

Our inner life finds expression in the outer life of society. The development or progress of society, therefore, goes along with the progress of the inner life, or in other words, the inner life reacts on and modifies the social life. Society is prior to the

individual and moulds his ideas and conceptions. But the individual is not the slave of society. He as much determines society as society determines him. When the laws and observances of society cease to reflect the moral ideal, the individual withdraws into himself and the result of such a withdrawal is a partial disruption of society which leads to a better reconstruction of it. Individualism is the medicine which society uses in order to cure itself of its corruptions. Individualistic theories of society and morality are most prevalent when society is more or less in a state of chaos. Stoicism was developed when the foundation of the ancient Greek state was undermined. The Kantian philosophy was promulgated when the French Revolution was about to agitate Europe.

There is yet another objection against the conception of society as a moral organism, which we have to meet. It may be said that it is impossible to regard society as the embodiment of our higher self in face of its so many imperfections and corruptions. How can social laws and regulations be viewed as the concrete realisation of the moral law within, when many of them are not only unjustifiable but immoral? "To an Athenian slave", as Green observes, "who might be used to gratify a master's lust, it would have been a mockery to

speak of the state as a realisation of freedom ; and perhaps it would not be much less so to speak of it as such to an untaught and under-fed denizen of a London Yard with gin shops on the right hand and on the left." The answer is that in the social organisation is to be included the *social ideal*. We are to feel ourselves identified not merely with society *as it is*, but with it as it *ought to be*. The proposition, "the social organism is the concrete embodiment of the moral ideal" does not mean that the moral ideal has in its entirety been realised in the social organism. To say so is essentially absurd. Whoever admits the ever-progressiveness of the moral ideal towards greater and greater perfection cannot give assent to such a proposition. But even the duty of trying to realise the higher ideals of morality in society, follows from my station in it. My duty, as a member of the social organism, is not to follow blindly the established customs and conventions of society but to try to bring them nearer to the higher ideal. But, on the other hand, we should not forget that the social organism *does*, to a large extent, embody the moral ideal. The kingdom of God in all its glory is no doubt far from being established on earth. But we should be fully alive to the fact that it *has* to some extent been established and to that extent our moral sal-

vation lies in being in harmony with it. The imperfections of society are no excuse for our standing aloof from it. We should identify ourselves with what good in it exists, striving to attain the ideal. Does not our individual life fall far short of the ideal? Do we proceed to commit suicide in order to escape from our moral imperfections? As in our individual life, we strive to attain the ideal while repudiating our lower self, so in our social life, our duty is to work for the attainment of the social ideal. To cut away from society because of its imperfections is as wise as to commit suicide in order to escape from our moral imperfections.

The principal ethical theory that stands opposed to the doctrine enunciated in the fore-going pages is Utilitarian Hedonism. Before closing this essay, therefore, I propose to briefly examine it and to compare what may be called the Ethics of Idealism with it and the Intuitionist Ethics.

Not perfection but pleasure is, according to hedonism, the moral end. Those actions are morally justifiable which secure for us the maximum of pleasure accompanied by the minimum of pain. If I wish to know whether a certain action performed by me is morally right, I have simply to find out whether it has brought me pleasure. But the

difficulty is that pleasure cannot be the moral end. The moral end must be objective and have a definite realisable content. Pleasurable feelings are a mere passing series and cannot consequently be the object of realisation. The moral end can only be that which it is possible to realise in practical life, and that which is realisable must be of permanent and definite content. Pleasures are vanishing, "which are not except in the moment or moments that they are felt." How, then, can they be the moral end? Progress is an essential element of morality, and it is precisely this which is impossible in a search after pleasure. The pleasure-seeker gains satisfaction only in the moment of enjoyment; immediately after, his heart becomes as empty as it was before, perhaps more. "This one comes", to use Mr. Bradley's language, "and the intense self-feeling proclaims satisfaction. It is gone and we are not satisfied." Sysiphus rolling his stone is not more unhappy than the man who makes pleasure the aim of life.

Pleasure as such is an abstraction. It is the *concomitant* of our activities and has been correctly described as the feeling of self-realisedness. As accurate psychological analysis yields this result: I, as a person endowed with will, want to realise myself. Now, self-realisation presup-

poses having some object in view. The object which I have in view, I *desire* to accomplish. So long as I cannot fulfil my desire, I feel a tension within me, which is the feeling of want. The moment I fulfil my desire, *ie*, carry out my object, I feel a certain amount of pleasure or satisfaction, which is, so to speak, the index of self-realisation. The feeling of pleasure does not precede or exist separately from, but *accompanies* acts of self-realisation. In every voluntary action, the elements necessarily involved are the subject willing and the object willed. These two must be opposed to each other, within the limits of an ultimate unity, of course. The impulse of the subject to realise the object takes the form of a feeling of craving or want. If the want be not removed, that is, if the self be not realised there ensues a feeling of pain. The consequence of the gaining of the object is pleasure. Pleasures and pains, therefore, cannot exist independently of the actions of which they are the concomitants. *They* are not prior to voluntary actions, but voluntary actions are prior to them. Hedonism commits the fatal mistake of confounding the feeling that accompanies the carrying out of some desired end with the end itself.

The gaining of pleasure and the avoidance of

pain is not always the object of voluntary actions. Mere anticipation of pleasure is not sufficient to rouse our activity. Unless there exists some want, no action can take place. The anticipation of the pleasure of eating, for example, cannot impel us to eat, when the stomach is full. There is a craving for food only when the body requires nourishment. The pleasure of eating, only adds strength to the motive, which is not pleasure at all. Pleasure is the result of supplying the nutriment and pain of withholding it. Pleasure ensues when some *need* is supplied and pain when it is not supplied. Not pleasure, therefore, but the desire to gain some *wanted* object is the motive to action. Pleasure is felt when the want is removed and pain if it is not removed. The law of pleasure and pain is thus formulated by Professor Bain: "States of pleasure are concomitant with an increase, and states of pain with an abatement of some or all of the vital functions." This law would not be open to any objection if a slight alteration were made in it. States of pleasure are not concomitant with a mere increase but with a *required* or *wanted* increase of the vital functions. Similarly, pain does not accompany an abatement, but a *more-than-necessary* abatement of the vital functions. An increase of a vital function, beyond a certain limit, may produce

pain instead of pleasure. On the other hand, an abatement may give rise to pleasure. We should expect an infant to go on sucking the mother's breast without stopping the movement, if Professor Bain's law were true. The infant ceases to suck when it no longer feels the need of sucking, or rather when its body has got sufficient nourishment. Even irrational animals guided by instincts and infants act not with a view to gain pleasure but to remove some fore-felt want. Pleasure, of course, accompanies the removal of want, but it is not itself the end of action. Similarly pain is avoided, not simply because in avoiding it there is pleasure, but because pain means some obstacle to self-realisation or the prolongation of some want.

Morality rests upon the distinction between what *is* and what *should be*. Now, the hedonistic theory of the will precludes the possibility of such a distinction. If it be true that the strongest motives always prevail, and pleasure is the only motive to action, it follows that every human being gains the maximum of pleasure possible for him, and is consequently moral in the highest degree. What he *should be* he *is*. For, his actions are guided by the strongest motives and the strongest motives are always desires for the attainment of the greatest

pleasure. If he fails in performing an action prompted by a desire for pleasure, it is not through any fault of his. His failure must be attributed to the unfavourable circumstances by which he is surrounded. If there is no obstacle to the action of a man, the strongest motive will prevail, and the strongest motive is, according to hedonism, desire for the greatest pleasure. By every action, therefore, performed by him, a human being obtains the largest quantity of pleasure. The natural laws of volition make him moral. No precept, no exhortation, no struggle, no discipline is necessary for that. "Should be", is a phrase that ought to be expunged from the vocabulary of the hedonist. Hedonism must boldly declare that no man is immoral, for, every man acts according to the desire that is strongest in his mind and such a desire, as it teaches, must be desire for the greatest pleasure. If an action fails to secure the anticipated pleasure, it is because the attempt to gain it has been baffled by untoward circumstances. No man can be blamed for not doing that which lies beyond his power.

The hedonistic system can recognise no uniform standard of morality. The capacity for pleasure of one man is not the same as that of another. Consequently, what is the maximum of pleasure to one may be the minimum of it to another. If so,

we have to accept the startling doctrine that every man must have a separate standard of morality. The same standard cannot suit all, for one whose power of enjoying pleasure is great, must necessarily have a higher standard than another whose capacity for enjoyment is limited. To give up the uniformity of standard, however, is to lay the axe at the roots of morality. For, whatever explanation may be given of morality, whatever may be the difference of opinion regarding its end and ideal, no system of ethics can dispense with a standard that is the same for all men. Where there is no common standard, there can be no system of moral rules equally binding on all men. The hedonist, debarred from upholding a uniform moral standard, must admit, if he is consistent, that what is a moral law to one may not be so to another. But to make such an admission is to abandon the very notion of morality and to allow free play to natural inclinations? Hedonism or asceticism, utilitarianism or intuitionism, realism or idealism, all must hold by an objective system of moral laws binding equally on all men and regulating their desires and inclinations. But the moral end proposed by hedonism makes a uniform standard and consequently a common code of morality impossible. Only a system of ethics that takes its stand on

the rational part of human nature can boast of a uniform moral standard. For, it is reason that is the same in all men. The feelings of one man are not the feelings of another man.

The next objection against hedonism that I have to urge is that there can never be an *aggregate* of pleasures, and consequently, "greatest pleasure" is a meaningless phrase, unless it be taken to mean an intense pleasure felt at a particular moment. Before I pass on to the enjoyment of the second pleasure, the first one is gone and the two, therefore, can never be added together. Either then, the greatest happiness is gained whenever an intense pleasure is enjoyed or it can never be gained. Just as it is impossible to hold water in a sieve, so it is impossible to accumulate a series of pleasures enjoyed in succession. But even if we admit, for argument's sake, that an aggregate of pleasures is possible, the difficulty of hedonism is not over. It is not enough to say that the greatest happiness is the moral end. The means of calculating pleasures must be pointed out. How am I to know what is the largest sum of pleasures? That which is pleasurable to one is not so to another, that in which one man finds the greatest happiness, utterly fails to give satisfaction to another man. So far as susceptibility to feelings is

concerned, men differ most widely from each other. Then, again, no certain means of gaining the greatest happiness, can be shown. It is not in the power of any man to say that such and such means will infallibly secure for us the greatest amount of happiness. The very same thing which makes us happy at one time may fail to please us at another time. The truth is that hedonism is an ethical theory that has no legs to stand upon. The moral end which it proposes as well as the means for compassing it, if such means exist at all, are, at best, uncertain.

Hedonism fails conspicuously in giving a satisfactory explanation of the sense of obligation. *Why* should I obey the moral laws, if pleasure is the sole aim of life? I should be left free to get as much pleasure as I can in my own way, without being fettered by the moral laws. The hedonist may answer that the best means of getting pleasure is not to make it the direct object of pursuit. Experience has proved that the greatest amount of happiness can be obtained only by obeying the rules framed by society for its guidance, which we call the moral laws. The evident answer to this is that nothing based on experience can be infallible. It is perhaps the case that happiness is *generally* got by obeying the rules of society, but you cannot

say that exceptional cases will not arise. 'Do not steal', is, according to hedonism, a rule of society. It may be that in 99 cases out of 100, happiness is got by refraining from theft. But can you say that the 100th case will not be an exceptional one? I am a poor man and cannot make two ends meet. My neighbour is a millionaire. I can make myself happy if I steal a few thousand rupees from his chest. To the millionaire, a few thousand rupees is nothing. Am I then, under such circumstances, justified in stealing? Perhaps the hedonist will answer, no. Such an act will set a bad example to others. But what if I know with certainty that the theft will not be detected? The truth is that the hedonist cannot escape such awkward questions. His theory is not only based on a fictitious abstraction but is positively immoral in its tendency.

The attempt to account for the sense of obligation by external force is not more successful. Those who, like Professor Bain, seek to explain the sense of obligation away by dogmatising that it is nothing but the inward reflection of the outward authority of law and the state overlook one important consideration. Common will and not force is the foundation of society. The state exercises sovereignty over individuals and secures their loyal-

ty, because it is an embodiment of their higher life. As long as a state helps its subjects to realise what they conceive to be their common good, it receives their homage. Any attempt to prevent the subjects from acting according to their common will, inevitably leads to the decline and to the ultimate dissolution of the state. The truth of this, we find exemplified, if we look at the records of foreign conquests. The cause of the downfall of the Mogal Empire in India was, in the main, the attempt of the Mahomedan emperors to convert Hindus to Islamism by force. The secret again, of the loyalty of the Indian people to the British throne lies in the fact that the English Government allows the Indians, within reasonable limits, to live in accordance with their own conception of well-being. Mere external force can never hold society together. However great may be the power of the state, it can never preserve order, if all the citizens cease to have reverence for the moral laws. The state could not exist unless there were a sense of obligation in the minds of its citizens to obey its laws. A state consisting of citizens having no sense of obligation—this is, by the way, a mere hypothesis—is like a body from which the soul has fled. As a lifeless body soon resolves itself into elementary atoms, so does a state composed of

citizens having no sense of obligation inevitably decline.

Hedonism is a selfish theory. The transformation which it has undergone in recent times has only been at the expense of consistency. There is no theory more self-contradictory than modern utilitarianism. According to it, the greatest happiness of the greatest number is the moral end. How can this be proved, if pleasure is the aim of life? A hedonist may very well ask, 'What business have I to concern myself with the greatest happiness of the greatest number? So far as I can see, my only care should be to get as much pleasure as I can for myself, if pleasure is the *summum bonum*. The answer which Mill has given to this objection, betrays the inherent weakness of utilitarianism. He says that no reason can be given why general happiness is desirable except that each one desires his own happiness. But this is no answer at all. Because each of my fellow-beings desires his own happiness, does it follow that I should try to make *them* happy? A hedonist may well resent such a demand. Why should he spend his valuable time in the attempt to secure happiness for others? If each one desires his own happiness, let each one try to make himself happy as best as he may.

In the preceding pages I have endeavoured to

indicate the main position of the ethics of idealism as distinguished from the "Ethics of Inwardness" and hedonism. I have also briefly indicated what I consider to be the weak points of the last two systems. But the ethics of idealism does not stand in a relation of mere exclusiveness to its rival theories. It incorporates into itself all that is essential in them and in this way goes beyond them. The "Ethics of Inwardness" has two principal forms—those which it assumes in the moral philosophy of Kant and in the ordinary intuitionist theories. The peculiarity of the Kantian ethics is the distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal self. The noumenal self imposes the moral law upon the phenomenal self, of which the latter is conscious as a categorical imperative. The very essence of the moral law, according to Kant, is to be self-imposed. On the other hand, the intuitionists conceive of the moral law as an arbitrary will of the Deity, given externally to man. To regard the moral law as self-imposed is, they suppose, to strike at the roots of morality. It is the sanction given by the Divine will to an act that makes it moral. What the will of God in a particular instance is can be known through the voice of conscience; for, the voice of conscience is the voice of God. Now the idealistic ethics easily harmonises

these two opposing views. It is both true that the moral law is self-imposed and imposed by God upon man; for, man's higher self is the Divine Being himself. The idealist has no hesitation in joining issue with Kant in proclaiming the autonomous character of the moral law. But at the same time he does not ignore the truth of the contention of the intuitionists that the voice of conscience is the voice of God. Kant's agnosticism or, at best, deism precluded him from seeing that the *Homo Noumenon* of which he speaks is the Absolute self of the universe or God. Had Kant perceived that nature is the manifestation of intelligence as clearly as he realised that it exists for mind, he would have seen that God is the supreme subject presupposed in the existence of the universe and that the self of man is a certain reproduction of itself on the part of the eternal mind. The distinction, which he supposed existed, between God and the *Homo Noumenon* would have disappeared and he would have been able to perceive the truth of the intuitionist doctrine that the moral law is given by God to man without surrendering his position that it is self-imposed. For, man's higher self being identical with God, it is the same thing to say that the moral law is imposed by God upon man as to say that it is self-imposed. Kant's ethical theory, indeed,

would have been open to serious objection if he had not drawn a distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal self and conceived of the moral law as the commandment of the former to the latter. As it is, only a slight change is needed to bring it into near relation to certain forms of the intuitional ethics.

The idealistic ethics has full sympathy with the "Ethics of Inwardness" in so far as it lays stress on the ethical "Thou shalt." But, as has already been pointed out, the inward must find its content in the outward. The moral law must be particularised and made definite by being embodied in the laws and observances of society. Man, as a moral being, cannot be determined merely by the consciousness of an inner law. The moral order of society which subordinates him as an individual is the field for the realisation of his higher nature. The laws of society are the content of the moral law just as nature is the content of mind. It is a mistake to suppose that obedience to the regulations of society is different in kind from obedience to the moral law. In paying homage to society, a human being only recognises the authority which the moral law has over him. In fact the vast majority of men are not conscious at all of the moral law in its abstract form. Their moral-

ity consists in obeying the injunctions of society and the state. "We become conscious," as Professor Caird says, "of being a law to ourselves not directly, but only by recognising that the law which at first seems to come from another, is really imposed by us upon ourselves." Subjective morality arises when the individual learns to reflect and finds that the outer law is inadequate to meet the requirements of the moral life. But, subjective morality is, after all, a morality of abstraction. Its use is, as we have already seen, that it draws the attention of individuals to the defects of society and thereby raises it to a higher plane. There is much truth, therefore, in the contention of the utilitarians that morality consists in obedience to the customs and usages of society. They only forget that the outer laws of society and the state, are the embodiment of the inner law. In laying emphasis on the objectivity of morality, they ignore its subjective aspect ; just as the upholders of the "Ethics of Inwardness" overlook the truth that the inner law is an abstraction if it not realised in the laws and customs of society. In fact, the way to get at the truth in this matter is to pit the intuitionist against the utilitarian and the utilitarian against the intuitionist. The intuitionist is right in holding that the moral law is unconditionally

binding on individuals and is not of empirical origin, but wrong in drawing a hard and fast distinction between the moral law and the laws of society. Similarly, the utilitarian is right when he maintains that the moral duties of an individual are all *social* duties, and flow from his station in the society to which he belongs, but he is wrong in conceiving of society as a collection of individuals held together by brute force or a social contract and in regarding the laws of society as limitations of the subjective freedom of the individual and enforced by a superior power alien to him. The ethics of idealism incorporates into itself all truth that there is in intuitionism and utilitarianism and transcends them. It accepts the doctrine of the utilitarians that the moral laws coincide with the laws of society and the state, but transforms their mechanical view of society by conceiving of it as the "objective realisation of freedom." Just as the necessity of nature becomes the mask of freedom, when it is conceived of as the manifestation of intelligence, so the laws of society cease to appear as the limitations of subjective freedom, when they are regarded as the embodiment of the moral law. The intuitionist in vindicating the absolute authority and subjectivity of the moral law forgets that it

must be objectively realised, while the utilitarian in laying stress on the objectivity of morality ignores the truth that it must be subjective as well. The ethics of idealism teaches that morality is both subjective and objective. The inner moral law is realised in the laws and customs of society and the laws and customs of society have their sanction in and derive their authority from the inner law. The relation between the moral law and the laws of society is the same as that between the universal and the particular.

"The greatest happiness of the greatest number" is the maxim of modern utilitarianism. The ethics of idealism virtually acknowledges the truth of all that is essential in it. In the exercise and development of our faculties, there is happiness. In fact, that happiness alone is true happiness which is the incident of self-realisation, or the growth and development of our faculties. There is a vast difference between the happiness of a drunkard or a sensualist, if happiness it can be called at all, and that of a scholar or a philanthropist. Can any comparison be instituted at all between the joy of an Archimedes and the drunken revelry of a sensualist? The happiness of a Howard who has been successful in alleviating human misery is on a far higher level than that of a miser looking with intense satisfac-

tion at his filled coffers. The truth is that pleasure is not *in itself* desirable, but it is the invariable concomitant of self-realisation, which alone is the moral end. • Mill's declaration that happiness cannot be got if it is made the direct object of pursuit, really amounts to a confession of the truth of what has just been said. Happiness cannot be got if it is directly aimed at, because happiness is not the end of our activity at all. However, the idealist has no hesitation in agreeing to the *dictum* of the utilitarian that the greatest happiness is the moral end, because greatest happiness is only the concomitant of the greatest degree of self-realisation. Nor does he demur to the addition of the words "of the greatest number." On the contrary, he welcomes it. It has already been seen that self-realisation is possible only in society. No one can realise his higher nature, if he does not make others his partners. The self-realisation of the one must necessarily go along with the self-realisation of the others. The idealist's position may be briefly stated in this way: Pleasure or happiness is the concomitant of self-realisation or the exercise of our faculties. The greatest pleasure, therefore, accompanies the greatest degree of self-realisation. But self-realisation presupposes the social union. The greatest degree of self-realisation and consequent-

ly the greatest happiness of the one depends upon the self-realisation of the others. Self-realisation is the moral end; as a consequence, the greatest happiness of the greatest number is the moral end.
